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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The on-demand economy has truly gone global. Consider online 
platform TaskRabbit, a U.S.-based site for odd jobs.1 A high number of 
TaskRabbit’s users were seeking help with the construction of furniture 
they purchased at IKEA, and skilled carpenters started using the 
platform to find customers.2 Corporate management at Swedish 
company IKEA noticed the trend, and as a result acquired TaskRabbit 
in 2017.3 As a result, a Swedish company now owns a platform labor 
service in the United States and Britain, with plans to expand the 
TaskRabbit platform to twenty-seven more countries where IKEA 
currently owns brick and mortar stores.4 Throughout its operation, 
however, TaskRabbit has claimed it only has a handful of employees, 
and the terms and conditions on its website list its workers as 
“independent contractors.”5  
 
 1. TASKRABBIT, https://taskrabbit.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 2. See Trisha Thadani, Behind IKEA’s Purchase of TaskRabbit, Amazon Looms, 
SFGATE (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:31 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Behind-Ikea-s-
purchase-of-Taskrabbit-amazon-12239062.php.  
 3. Cf. Richard Milne, IKEA Looks for Further Deals After TaskRabbit Purchase, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/79661ccc-ada0-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130 
(describing further acquisitions following the purchase of TaskRabbit).  
 4. Brian Fung, IKEA Has Purchased TaskRabbit, Because #adulting Is Hard, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/28/ikea- 
has-purchased-taskrabbit-to-help-you-bypass-those-assembly-instructions/?noredirect=on.  
 5. Jeff John Roberts, IKEA’s Latest Acquisition Will Help Assemble Your IKEA 
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 Two other examples effectively illustrate the global nature of on-
demand work. Digital platform Upwork, headquartered in Mountain 
View, California, hosts and parcels out assorted computer 
programming, graphic design, and data-entry tasks.6 Upwork posts 
tasks from requesters around the world, and likewise, the workers on 
the platform live around the world, most often working from their 
homes.7 A final example is U.K. company Chatterbox, which uses its 
platform to connect remote workers in Syrian refugee camps with users 
in many other countries who pay to learn Arabic.8 In the past, foreign 
companies have used platforms to engage Kenyan nationals living in 
refugee camps with tasks as diverse as computer programming and 
customer support calls.9  
 On-demand platforms are changing and reshaping our 
conceptions of both the firm and work relationship in far-reaching and 
critical ways, allowing companies to hire workers and to seek 
customers across national boundaries.10 Meanwhile, as on-demand 
platforms have scaled their operations in the last decade, regulators 
 
 6. See Erika Fry, The Gig Economy Isn’t Just for Startups Anymore, FORTUNE (Aug. 
29, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/08/29/the-gig-economy-isnt-just-for-startups-anymore/ 
(noting Fortune 500 companies outsourcing tasks to platforms like Upwork); see also Mariya 
Aleksynska et al., Work on Digital Labour Platforms in Ukraine: Issues and Policy 
Perspectives, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (ILO) (2018), https://www.ilo.org/travail/WCMS_635 
370/lang--en/index.htm (discussing how Ukraine ranks fourth for work on digital labour 
platforms and the consequences for labour market and society); Carey Wodehouse, What Kind 
of Freelance Talent Can You Hire Through Upwork?, UPWORK (Nov. 14, 2017), https:// 
www.upwork.com/hiring/for-clients/kinds-of-freelancers-on-upwork/ (listing types of work 
available on the Upwork platform).  
 7. The nations supplying the most labor on Upwork are India, Philippines, Ukraine, 
Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, United States, China, Canada, Poland, Belarus, Romania, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Argentina, Serbia, Armenia, Germany, and Egypt. The diversity of these 
supplier countries demonstrates the truly global nature of these platforms. See John Horton et 
al., Digital Labour Markets and Global Talent Flows tbl.3B (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper 
No. 17-096, 2017), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17-096_813abb74-09c5-
4ea6-989f-5ef03b2d7f31.pdf.  
 8. Lorraine Charles, How Remote Work Could Help Refugees, WORLD ECON. F. 
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/remote-work-could-help-refugees/ 
(noting language tutoring and computer programming work in Syrian refugee camps and 
encouraging the growth of such work). 
 9. See Stephanie Hegarty, How Silicon Valley Outsources Work to African Refugees, 
BBC NEWS (June 18, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13784487; Our Impact, 
SAMASOURCE, https://www.samasource.com/our-impact (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
 10. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 19 (2006). Also note the use of the terms “on-demand” 
or “gig work,” rather than the terminology of the “sharing economy.” The author believes that 
“sharing” is a misnomer, given that systems of platform work involve remuneration and 
participation on these platforms is highly commoditized. See Miriam A. Cherry, Corporate 
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around the world have struggled to keep pace with the challenges to 
labor regulation that platforms have presented.11 While some 
commentators believe existing forms of labor and employment 
regulations can stretch to cover on-demand work,12 others have called 
for new legal initiatives specifically crafted for online platforms.13 
Confronted with low pay and problematic working conditions,14 gig 
workers around the world have turned to the courts, attempting to 
invoke the protections of traditional labor and employment law.15 Court 
cases were first seen in the United States, where many platforms had 
their origins.16 As the platforms have spread to many countries, similar 
 
 11. Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 
37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584-85 (2016) [hereinafter Cherry, Digital Transformation 
of Work] (listing lawsuits about employment in the gig economy filed in the United States and 
discussing the digital transformation of work). 
 12. See JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF WORK 
IN THE GIG ECONOMY 78 (2018) (noting similarities between old forms of work and new forms 
of work, in instances like “open calls” for work by stevedores on the docks); see also Matthew 
W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in Historical Perspective, 37 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 603, 608 (2016) (drawing links between piecework and homework in traditional 
industrialization and computer crowdwork). 
 13. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, DISCUSSION PAPER 
2015-10, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: 
THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 2 (Dec. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/ 
modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf (proposing a 
third intermediate category of “independent worker” located in between employee and 
independent contractor); see, e.g., Vin Gurrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee 
Classification, LAW360 (May 6, 2016, 8:50 PM), https:///www.law360.com/articles/793584/ 
print?section=classaction; see also Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent 
Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 650-56 
(2017) (discussing a comparative and historical approach to the third category). 
 14. See Mark R. Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, WASH. 
POST (June 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/asking-tough-questions-
about-the-gig-economy/2015/06/18/b43f2d0a-1461-11e5-9ddc-e3353542100c_story.html. In 
the 2016 ILO study, crowdworkers were asked about the upsides and downsides of their work 
and there were some common themes. Complaints about low pay were common. The ILO data 
show that American crowdworkers averaged $5.55 an hour, below the federal minimum wage 
of $7.25 an hour. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (2018). Many crowdworkers in 
the ILO survey remarked that they had high search costs, i.e., that it took them a long time to 
find appropriate tasks on the website, so that they spent more time looking for work than they 
actually spent doing it. Still others noted that their work could be rejected by the requester on 
a summary basis, without reasons provided. All of these led to dissatisfaction among those 
surveyed. Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy 
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers 14-15 (ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment 
Series No. 74, Working Paper, 2016) [hereinafter Berg, Income Security]. 
 15. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11 (listing the ongoing 
litigation surrounding the on-demand economy in the United States); see also SARAH KESSLER, 
GIGGED: THE END OF THE JOB AND THE FUTURE OF WORK 111 (2018) (“Soon it was difficult to 
find any company that brokered independent workers and didn’t have a lawsuit on its hands.”).  
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types of litigation have followed in their wake. Currently, cases are 
being heard around the world on the question of whether gig workers 
are “employees” or “independent contractors.”17 These include 
ongoing litigation in the United Kingdom,18 Brazil,19 Spain,20 
Belgium,21 Colombia,22 and Australia.23 So far, these decisions have 
applied different standards, and to date have been reaching conflicting 
conclusions.24  
 Despite crowdwork being a genuine global system of work, these 
precedents set the stage for inconsistent rulings and conflicts of law. 
Transnational ownership and international worker participation on 
crowdwork platforms present timely and compelling business, 
technology, and labor law questions. Many digital platforms are truly 
multinational enterprises, and we can expect to see difficult compliance 
issues come into play for these businesses. Within the next decade, the 
spread of online crowdwork will result in even more litigation, creating 
difficult questions in the labyrinth of rules that comprise private 
international law, i.e., jurisdiction, choice of law, and conflicts of law.25 
 
 17. Valerio De Stefano, Platform Work and Labour Protection. Flexibility Is Not 
Enough, REG. FOR GLOBALIZATION BLOG (May 23, 2018), http://regulatingforglobalization. 
com/2018/05/23/platform-work-labour-protection-flexibility-not-enough/ [hereinafter De 
Stefano, Platform Work]. 
 18. For more on the situation in the United Kingdom and Europe, see, for example, 
Anna Birtwistle & Clare Murray, Around the World in 80 Ubers: Is the Law Keeping Up with 
the Uberisation of Work in Europe?, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (July 7, 2017), https://whoswholegal. 
com/features/features/around-the-world-in-80-ubers-is-the-law-keeping-up-with-the-uberisation- 
of-work-in-europe. 
 19. Maria Cristina Frias, Uber Drivers Are Employees, Court Decides in Brazil, 
FOLHA DE S. PAULO (Aug. 28, 2018, 12:18 PM), https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/ 
en/business/2018/08/uber-drivers-are-employees-court-decides-in-brazil.shtml. 
 20. De Stefano, supra note 17.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Rico, Court Rules Against Uber and Its 83,000 Drivers, TODAY COLOM. (Jan. 19, 
2018), http://todaycolombia.com/court-rules-against-uber-and-its-83000-drivers/ (noting 
Colombia’s Corte Constitutional decision requiring Uber to comply with employment laws as 
well as laws applying to taxi companies). 
 23. See discussion infra Part II; see also Ignasi Beltran de Heredia Ruiz, Employment 
Status of Platform Workers, UNA MIRADA CRÍTICA A LAS RELACIONES LABORALES (Dec. 9, 
2018), https://ignasibeltran.com/2018/12/09/employment-status-of-platform-workers-national- 
courts-decisions-overview-australia-brazil-chile-france-italy-united-kingdom-united-states-
spain/#%C3%ADndice (listing court cases across various jurisdictions). For Australia, see 
Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford, Regulating Work in the Gig Economy: What Are the 
Options?, 28 ECON. & LAB. REV. 420, 425-29 (2017) (noting uncertainty as to the legal status 
of gig workers). 
 24. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17; see discussion infra Part III.  
 25. In Europe, the legal terminology used for these concepts is “private international 
law.” While both terms are used interchangeably in this Article, I tend to prefer “conflicts of 





6 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:x 
 
Jurisdiction refers to the ability of a court to decide a dispute.26 Choice 
of law pertains to the law that a court with jurisdiction will apply.27 
Conflicts of law is the body of law determining, in the absence of a 
choice-of-law provision, what law to apply when a foreign element is 
involved.28 At the moment the pending cases about the on-demand 
economy have largely focused on the issue of employee/independent 
contractor status.29 Misclassification, however, is only the threshold 
question. Beyond the threshold of employee status lies additional 
issues, such as the application of substantive rights for workers that 
vary drastically depending on the law that is applied.30 For example, 
minimum wage and working time laws vary drastically depending on 
which jurisdiction’s laws are applied.31 The same is true for collective 
bargaining, worker’s compensation, or unemployment insurance.32 
Different countries’ conflicts-of-law rules could potentially yield 
different answers for each phase of doctrinal law and policy.  
 The conundrum is that work has traditionally been conceived of 
as a localized activity, largely regulated on a national basis, while the 
 
 26. LOUISE MERRETT, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 
(2011). But see Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 
319 (2002) (using “jurisdiction” to stand in not only for the concept of being able to hear a 
dispute, but also to the determination that a certain jurisdiction’s law will apply). 
 27. MERRETT, supra note 26. 
 28. See GEERT VAN CALSTER, EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2d ed. 
2016).  
 29. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17. 
 30. Basic rights, like the freedom to organize and bargain collectively as part of a 
union, rest on the outcome of the classification debate, and in many legal systems, only 
“employees” have these types of rights. See Hannah Johnston & Chris Land-Kazlauskas, 
Organizing On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective Bargaining in the Gig 
Economy 2 (ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 94, Working Paper, 2019). 
Classification can also have implications for intellectual property rights. California law states 
that employers own the work of their employees under the work made for hire, but there is no 
such rule for independent contractors. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351.5(c) (West 2019); CAL. 
UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 686, 621(b) (West 2019); Matthew Swanlund, Work Made for Hiring, 
L.A. LAW., Mar. 2016, at 25, 25 (“California businesses face a critical decision . . . . They may 
take advantage of the benefits afforded by the work-made-for-hire doctrine . . . but be treated 
under California law as an employer, or they may sacrifice the benefits of the work-made-for-
hire doctrine yet maintain the independent contractor status of [their] creative workers.”). 
 31. See Miriam A. Cherry, Mindestlohm für Crowdarbeit? [A Minimum Wage for 
Crowdwork?], in CROWDWORK-ZURÜCK IN DIE ZUKUNFT? PERSPEKTIVEN DIGITALER ARBEIT 
[CROWDWORK—BACK TO THE FUTURE? PERSPECTIVES ON DIGITAL LABOR] 231-40 (2014) 
(Ger.) (chapter translated into German for book publication); Miriam A. Cherry, Working for 
(Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. 
L. REV. 1077, 1093-94 (2009).  
 32. For example, most crowdwork websites lack a way to verify with certainty that 
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incontrovertible fact is that many crowdwork platforms either are or 
aspire to become genuine multinational enterprises.33 With crowdwork 
performed wholly on the computer, like the Upwork example, the 
company or person who is ordering work could be located in one 
nation, the platform itself could be located in a second nation, and the 
workers could be located in many other nations.34 Indeed, the 
innovative promise of crowdwork lies in its global nature, allowing 
more workers and companies to participate.35 Global crowdwork can 
take advantage of temporal differences (the shift in time zones around 
the world) as well as allowing companies to hire skilled workers, 
regardless of their location. 
 For on-demand platforms, this may present difficult legal 
compliance problems. Currently some platforms have aspirations of 
becoming “global workspaces,” hosting both requesters and workers 
from dozens of countries.36 At the moment, there is a void in 
regulation.37 However, as courts continue to make decisions and 
countries begin to pass laws with differing and particular regulations 
requiring compliance, those laws will likely not be uniform between 
nations. The need to calculate dozens of minimum wages or to comply 
with various procedural and administrative rules will likely result in 
time-consuming and potentially costly compliance issues for 
platforms. While platforms may attempt to engage in self-help through 
private ordering through the terms and conditions of online contracts, 
some labor and employment laws are considered mandatory or 
nonwaivable.38 Such practices might also raise a concern about forum 
shopping, or the “race to the bottom” in labor standards.39  
 
 33. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 471, 487 (2010) [hereinafter Cherry, Global Dimensions] (describing transnational work 
relationships within video games and in virtual worlds). 
 34. Aniket Kittur et al., The Future of Crowd Work, CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED 
COOPERATIVE WORK & SOC. COMPUTING 1301 (2013), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm? 
id=2441923. 
 35. Cherry, Global Dimensions, supra note 33, at 483. 
 36. Miriam A. Cherry & Winifred R. Poster, Crowdwork, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and Fair Labor Practices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 291 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016). 
 37. Cherry, Global Dimensions, supra note 33, at 487. 
 38. See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 156 (2005); Alex Rosenblat 
& Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s 
Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758, 3764 (2016). 
 39. For a discussion of arbitration in the on-demand economy, see Charlotte Garden, 
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 These are challenging sets of problems. The beginnings of 
solutions may be found by thinking about other regulatory structures 
that exist outside of territorial boundaries. Here, specifically, I make 
reference to the recently passed General Data Protection Regulation in 
the European Union,40 which has extraterritorial application to the 
protection of privacy; to the international rules that govern employment 
of transportation workers, specifically those engaged in maritime 
employment; and to the corporate codes of conduct and social 
responsibility followed by many multinational companies.41 In 
essence, we can profit from thinking about on-demand platforms as 
another way that labor moves through the global supply chains, except 
that those supply chains are for services, not products. 
 The goal of this Article is to provide a global framework for 
thinking about the on-demand business model and these assorted 
conflicts-of-law and jurisdictional issues.42 Part II provides the 
theoretical background, supplied by labor and employment law 
scholarship. As Part II notes, the on-demand model provides a 
challenge to the received wisdom that employment is inherently local. 
Part III then discusses the specific context of on-demand crowdwork, 
providing background themes, an explanation of the legal issues, and a 
survey of the current state of the literature. Part IV analyzes the 
jurisdiction and conflict-of-law issues through the lenses of three 
jurisdictions that are of great importance to crowdwork: California, the 
European Union, and India. Part IV also looks at terms of use and 
forum selection clauses. As the toolkit of private international law 
provides few definite answers, Part V looks at alternative ways of 
thinking about regulation, drawing parallels to the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), international maritime 
law, and multinational codes of conduct and corporate social 
responsibility. Throughout, this Article emphasizes the need for further 
coordinated multilateral study, discussion, and regulatory action to 
assist both crowdworkers and businesses as they navigate the on-
demand model of production. 
 
 40. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (EU). 
 41. See discussion infra Part V.  
 42. While this Article formulates an initial framework and adumbrates the issues in 
three jurisdictions, this Article is not intended as a comprehensive study of how each 
jurisdiction across the world would approach these issues. Apart from treaties like the Rome 
Convention, each national legal system has its own method for determining jurisdiction, 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Previous scholarship provides the context for discussing the 
jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and conflict-of-law issues that arise around 
transnational employment relationships. For many decades, labor and 
employment lawyers tended to neglect jurisdictional issues; and 
lawyers who were studying conflicts of law tended to ignore labor law 
issues.43 In 1984, International Labour Organization (ILO) attorney 
Felice Morgenstern wrote the first English full-length treatment of the 
intersection of these fields in her book entitled International Conflicts 
of Labour Law.44 Morgenstern described complex sets of legal issues 
that she had encountered at the ILO, all of which dealt with labor and 
employment issues involving a “foreign element.”45 The book covered 
many of the issues raised by the employment of itinerant workers, 
posted workers, offshoring and outsourcing operations, and labor 
relations within multinational corporations.46  
 Within her book and a preceding article,47 Morgenstern notes the 
development of rules and concepts surrounding transnational 
employment. As her book describes, some approaches looked at the 
location of the contract’s execution, while others looked at the domicile 
and nationality of the parties or the location of the company’s 
headquarters, and still others to the location where the work occurred.48 
Overall, however, Morgenstern noted that the received wisdom seemed 
to converge on the idea of looking at the physical location of where the 
work took place, supplemented by the law of the employing firm’s 
 
 43. See, e.g., Martin Franzen, Conflicts of Laws in Employment Contracts and 
Industrial Relations, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 245, 245 (Roger Blanpain ed., 11th ed. 2014) (“Truly 
international sources governing conflicts of law in our field [labor and employment law] are 
not numerous, though of growing importance.”).  
 44. FELICE MORGENSTERN, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS OF LABOUR LAW: A SURVEY 
OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT RELATION (1984). This was the 
first book-length treatment of the subject to appear in the English language, and it cited and 
quoted cases from around the world. Rolf Birk, International Conflicts of Labour Law, 79 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1120, 1120 (1985) (book review) (“The book is, in fact, the first English-language 
monograph on international conflicts of labor law.”). 
 45. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 1. 
 46. Id. passim. 
 47. Felice Morgenstern & Blaise Knapp, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Extraterritorial Application of Labour Law, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 769, 770 (1978).  
 48. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 61-64. For more on the triangular nature of the 
relationship with the platform, see Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, TaskRabbit, and Co.: 
Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & 
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“home base.”49 Her approach was doctrinal and practical, looking to 
statutes and case law, where applicable. 
 Since that time, the intersection of labor and private international 
law as a doctrinal category has received only sporadic interest from 
academics. Within the United States, there is some attention to the issue 
when the employment laws of one state conflict with another state’s 
laws. Most notably, the fact that California bans noncompetition 
agreements (while other states recognize them) has prompted a 
discussion among legal scholars.50 In the European Union, scholars 
have tended to focus on the impact and application of the rules around 
the Rome Regulation.51 These accounts and ones like it tend to be more 
practical than theoretical.52 There has also been a robust discussion 
about the longstanding issues with posted workers throughout the 
European Union, as well as workers who live on one side of a border 
yet work in another.53 In all of this scholarship, which is focused on the 
practical outcomes for certain groups of workers or multinational 
companies, employment law is generally conceived of as largely a local 
issue.54 
 During the approximately thirty-five years between when 
Morgenstern was writing and the date of this Article, the globalization 
 
 49. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 121 (“Many of the conflicts and uncertainties 
inherent in the subject would seem to be due to the difficulty of establishing a clear dividing 
line between the legitimate scope of the law of the place of work and that of the home base 
. . . .”).  
 50. Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition 
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1381, 1386-87 (2008); Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee 
Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389, 389 
(2010); Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 941-43 
(2012). 
 51. See MERRETT, supra note 26; Uglješa Grušić, Jurisdiction in Employment Matters 
Under Brussels I: A Reassessment, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 91, 97-99 (2012). 
 52. See MERRETT, supra note 26; Grušić, supra note 51. 
 53. See Cecilia Pérez Martínez, Where Will the Case Be Heard? Which Is the 
Applicable Law? Approach to Selected Problems of Transnational Employment Relationships, 
5 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 5, 5-6 (2015). 
 54. See, e.g., Ron McCallum, Conflicts of Laws and Labour Law in the New Economy, 
16 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 50, 52 (2003) (“Throughout history, the performance of paid work has 
been a local affair. This is because workers are flesh and blood human beings who live in 
family groups, and who undertake employment to support themselves and their families by 
earning money to provide food, shelter, clothing, recreation and the education of children.”); 
see also Martínez, supra note 53 (“[L]abor and employment has always been regulated locally 
and for local employee-employer relationships. Traditionally, domestic regulations have not 
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of work and the pace of technological change has vastly accelerated.55 
In the words of Professor Marie-Ange Moreau, “[t]he relationship 
between time, place, and space of action has . . . changed in profound 
ways” due to technology and globalization.56 Legal doctrine, Professor 
Moreau argues, has yet to “come to conceptual terms with this 
transnationalization.”57 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, legal theorists 
such as Katherine Van Wezel Stone began to grapple with transnational 
labor law as well as problems of labor standards in the global supply 
chain.58 
 In his 2001 article Labour Law Beyond Borders, Professor Patrick 
Macklem noted that flexible forms of production and economic 
globalization were creating profound challenges for systems of labor 
and employment law traditionally based on national regulation.59 As a 
counterweight, Macklem pointed to international minimum standard 
setting by the ILO, the insertion of human rights norms and labor 
standards in trade liberalization treaties, and multinational firms’ 
corporate codes of conduct and social responsibility.60  
 In 2009, Professor Guy Mundlak picked up on Macklem’s 
proposals, emphasizing the need to de-territorialize labor law.61 In his 
article, Mundlak argues that with the ongoing process of globalization, 
the territorial solutions previously created within labor law are no 
longer adequate.62 Interestingly, he suggests identifying the location of 
the ultimate beneficiaries of products and services as the appropriate 
place to look for labor and employment regulation.63 As Mundlak puts 
it, “Regulation of the labor market should be associated with the de-
 
 55. Marie-Ange Moreau, The Reconceptualization of the Employment Relationship 
and Labor Rights Through Transnationality, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 697, 697 (2013).  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 698. 
 58. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four 
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987 (1995) (examining 
the challenges to domestic and international labor regulation); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To 
the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 93 (1999) (discussing certain “survival necessities” of global labor workers). 
 59. Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 605 
(2002). 
 60. Id. at 637-45. 
 61. See Guy Mundlak, De-Territorializing Labor Law, 3 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 
189, 189 (2009).  
 62. Id. 
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facto employment relationship, as viewed in terms of social and 
economic reliance.”64  
 International expert Professor Harry Arthurs has also discussed 
transnational labor law extensively. In his article Extraterritoriality by 
Other Means, Arthurs notes that labor law has a tendency to “sneak” or 
to be smuggled across borders.65 Sometimes one state’s laws present a 
strategy or template for the law in another country, as Arthurs notes is 
true of the United States and Canada.66 Other times, multinational 
companies import their own standards and norms into the countries 
where they employ workers.67 This can be a positive experience for 
workers, raising local standards; or multinationals can receive 
exemptions even from lower standards, because some governments are 
desperate for foreign investment.68 
 In light of this theoretical background, computer crowdwork on 
global technological platforms presents a unique and almost existential 
challenge for traditional territorial thinking. In essence, crowdwork 
turns the dependence on national systems for regulation of employment 
and labor law upside down. The received wisdom in private 
international law doctrine, which is based on territoriality, physical 
presence, and habitual place of work fundamentally does not comport 
with the global nature of crowdwork. While theorists such as Arthurs, 
Stone, Macklem, and Mundlak have all noted this disconnect as it 
pertained to earlier forms of globalized work and global supply chains, 
computer crowdwork puts these issues into even sharper relief.69 With 
this theory in place, we now turn to examine how platform businesses 
have truly “gone global.” 
 
 64. Id.  
 65. Harry Arthurs, Extraterritoriality by Other Means: How Labor Law Sneaks Across 
Borders, Conquers Minds, and Controls Workplaces Abroad, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 527, 
529 (2010) [hereinafter Arthurs, Extraterritoriality] (“[L]abor laws in fact ‘sneak across 
borders’ relatively unconstrained by the extraterritoriality doctrine . . . .”).  
 66. Id. at 534-35; see also Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global 
Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 279 (2001) 
(describing the adoption of American labor laws in Canada).  
 67. Arthurs, Extraterritoriality, supra note 65, at 540. 
 68. See id. at 544; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our Boundaries: 
Transnational Employment Law Practice and the Export of American Lawyering Styles to the 
Global Worksite, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 257, 321-22 (2004) (noting the development of 
lawyering styles to accommodate clients seeking less regulation).  
 69. Arthurs, Extraterritoriality, supra note 65; Macklem, supra note 59; Mundlak, 
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III. THE GLOBAL REACH OF PLATFORM BUSINESSES 
A. Background on Platform Development   
 Overviews of how on-demand platforms operate are by now well-
covered in the popular press70 and the academic literature.71 In 2016, a 
survey by Time Magazine found that over forty-five million people in 
the United States were working in the “gig,” “on-demand,” or 
“sharing” economy.72 Since the time of that study, the popularity of 
online platforms has continued to grow around the world, making gig 
work a truly global phenomenon.73 As the vanguard of these trends 
toward more flexible and contingent work, labor in the on-demand 
economy has received both its share of positive and negative attention 
in the media and in the courts. Positive news stories focus on the 
opportunities generated for people who need and want more flexible 
days and more flexible hours than a typical forty-hour-a-week job 
 
 70. Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, 
NATION (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-ghosts- 
digital-machine/. 
 71. As such, this Part has been adapted from the Author’s earlier work that described 
the particular features, structures, economics, and legal issues of the gig economy. See Cherry, 
Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11. See generally Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized 
Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig 
Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653 (2016) (presenting case study analysis 
of on-demand platforms and their terms of service); Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating 
Employment Relationships in the Sharing Economy, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2016) 
(discussing how the sharing economy demonstrates an employment relationship that demands 
a regulatory response); Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-
Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 471 (2016) (analyzing opportunities and risks within the gig economy using the 
lens of labor protection); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016) 
(arguing the platform economy presents a paradigm shift for business); Benjamin Means & 
Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016) (arguing 
that flexibility in time, place, manner, and frequency should determine work classification); 
Brishen Rodgers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015) 
(discussing Uber’s impact on the car-hire sector, its standards, and the future of low-wage 
work).  
 72. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 
2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/. According to a 2016 report from the 
Congressional Research Service, if temporary work, on-call work, part-time work, and “self-
employment” in the United States are included in this trend, the issues around alternative work 
arrangements have an impact on nearly one-third of the labor force. See SARAH A. DONOVAN 
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44365, WHAT DOES THE GIG ECONOMY MEAN FOR 
WORKERS? 4-7 (2016). 
 73. JANINE BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS AND THE FUTURE OF WORK: 
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would provide.74 Sharing websites and mobile apps also may provide a 
quick and easy way for customers to seek out assistance. Negative 
stories, on the other hand, focus on the terms and conditions of the 
work, including a lack of benefits and opportunity for advancement.75 
These stories detail the uncertainty of on-demand platforms for 
workers, the low rates of pay provided on some platforms, and the 
amount of unpaid search time that goes into finding the next gig.76 Ever 
since Uber became a popular app, most people have at least a passing 
familiarity with how on-demand platforms operate.77 Accordingly, the 
background provided herein is streamlined. 
 The on-demand business model has offered important 
innovations; instead of buying or selling a good, users of certain 
platforms could rent access to what they needed.78 A driver with a car 
could transform an ordinary morning commute into a profit-generating 
enterprise by picking up a passenger on Uber or Lyft. Other websites, 
like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, crowdsourced computer tasks to a 
global market of workers, using only very small slices of time.79 
Websites that were part of “prosumer” movements involved customers 
in design or marketing decisions, only to then sell them products.80 
These business models in and of themselves were different compared 
to the standard models of sales that firms had typically employed. 
 The specifics and mechanics may differ, but crowdworking 
platforms share common characteristics. Through a market-making 
function they create an “open call” that then matches discrete tasks to 
the on-demand workers.81 One category of on-demand work involves 
tasks that take place in the real world, and that are powered by a website 
or app.82 Well-known examples include websites and apps that range 
 
 74. Charles, supra note 8. 
 75. Marvit, supra note 70; Kittur et al, supra note 34. 
 76. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 15, at 78-79 (noting call center platforms that 
advertised paying minimum wage, as if that were something to brag about). 
 77. MadeinTYO, Uber Everywhere, YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=BcyFJLrBVhA (not-safe-for-work rap about taking Uber everywhere because 
of its ubiquity); cf. Brian De Los Santos, Rapper Who Got Famous off Uber Declares Beef, Is 
Switching to Lyft, MASHABLE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/01/30/madeintyo-
hates-uber/ (noting rapper’s change of heart toward Uber).  
 78. Cf. KESSLER, supra note 15, at 46 (describing an art rental platform). 
 79. See Steinmetz, supra note 72. 
 80. JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE 
FUTURE OF BUSINESS 1-4 (2008) (describing the “Threadless” website). 
 81. Steinmetz, supra note 72. Some platforms set prices, while others have an auction 
function that allow requesters to bid and the workers to accept bids. 
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from Uber (ridesharing),83 GrubHub (food delivery),84 and Handy 
(home repair).85 The other category, exemplified by Upwork or by 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), involves completion of computer 
tasks online. On these computer sites, the requests, the hosting, and the 
work itself are all performed online.86  
 A convergence of critical thought and attention is beginning to 
crystalize around the gig economy, contained in the popular press, in 
computer science accounts, sociological studies, economic studies, in 
business schools, in law reviews, and in the courts. Various accounts 
have emerged that document and analyze key characteristics of on-
demand platforms: (1) reliance upon, and placement within, the 
information society;87 (2) the globalization of the platforms, the 
requesters, and the workforces involved;88 (3) dependence on trust and 
reputation proxies such as rating systems;89 (4) use of big data and 
surveillance to track work and workers;90 (5) use of just-in-time 
scheduling of labor relations;91 and (6) the management of workers by 
algorithm.92     
 While the traditional employment relationship involved a steady 
forty-hour work week, hierarchical structure and advancement, along 
with accompanying benefits, the on-demand model instead stresses 
limited commitment and extreme flexibility.93 Rather than having an 
assigned employee take on tasks as work arises, work is broken down 
into smaller pieces and placed out via Internet or cellular phone app on 
an “open call.”94 Workers sign in and complete tasks at their own pace 
and on their own time. There are no obligations of the worker or the 
platform to each other past the conclusion of one particular gig or 
 
 83. UBER, www.uber.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).  
 84. GRUBHUB, www.grubhub.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).  
 85. HANDY, www.handy.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 86. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17, makes the distinction between work 
performed entirely in cyberspace and work that originates on an app or Internet platform, and 
then is performed in the “real world.” See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1-3. 
 87. Cherry & Poster, supra note 36, at 294. 
 88. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 595.  
 89. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 38, at 3775. 
 90. Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 961, 962, 988 (2017).  
 91. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17. 
 92. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 38, at 3762. 
 93. Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 598-99. 
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task.95 Yet systems of surveillance sit atop the workflow, and 
algorithmic management controls and directs work activities.96     
B. Conflicting Law in the Gig Economy 
 A recurring critical legal issue in considering work in the on-
demand economy stems from confusion over the proper employment 
classification of platform workers. Many platforms have labeled 
workers who used their platforms as “independent contractors” through 
terms of service listed on a website or on a mobile app.97 The matter of 
employment classification, however, is not decided by a company’s 
label or terms of service. Rather, courts determine classification based 
on a number of factors, primarily the amount of control exerted over 
the worker or how the work is performed, and whether the workers 
look like an independent business, based on their indicia of 
entrepreneurial activity.98 Classification as an employee is a “gateway” 
to determine who deserves the protections of labor and employment 
laws, including the right to organize, minimum wage, and 
unemployment compensation, to name just a few of the benefits that 
are part and parcel of employee status.99 As such, classification as an 
employee is actually “an important instrument for the delivery of 
workers’ rights.”100  
 Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an employee or independent 
contractor is determined through various multifactor tests dependent on 
the facts of the relationship.101 The “control” test derives from case law 
 
 95. Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 596; see also Garden, 
supra note 39 (discussing arbitration agreements in the on-demand economy).  
 96. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 38, at 3762, 3765. 
 97. Miriam A. Cherry, The Sharing Economy and the Edges of Contract Law: 
Comparing U.S. and U.K. Approaches, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1804, 1809 (2017) [hereinafter 
Cherry, The Sharing Economy]. 
 98. Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 582. 
 99. Finkin, supra note 12, at 611. 
 100. Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as 
a Viable (Though Over-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR 
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 133, 134 (Guy Davidov & Brian 
Langille eds., 2006). 
 101. See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006) [hereinafter Stone, Legal Protections] (listing 
factors from the cases); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) 
(examining the definition of “employee” in the FLSA); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 
331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947) (defining what it means to “employ” a worker); Ira S. Bushey & 
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1968) (considering the scope of 
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and decisions on agency law and focuses on a principal’s right to 
control the worker.102 In brief, the factors for finding employee status 
are whether the employer may direct the way in which the work is 
performed, determine the hours involved, and provide the employee 
with direction.103 On the other hand, elements that lean toward 
independent contractor classification include high-skilled work, 
workers providing their own equipment, workers setting their own 
schedules, and getting paid per project, not per hour.104 In an alternate 
test, courts examine the economic realities of the relationship to 
determine whether the worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial activity, or 
whether the worker is financially dependent upon the employer.105 A 
third test that has recently been gaining ground is the ABC test.106 
Under all these tests, the label affixed to the relationship is a factor in 
the outcome, but it is certainly not dispositive.107 In any event, the tests 
are notoriously malleable, difficult, and fact-dependent, even when 
dealing with what should be a fairly straightforward analysis.108 
 Many commentators had hoped that the wage and hour lawsuits 
within platform companies that have been pending in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California would conclude, 
 
 102. See Stone, Legal Protections, supra note 101, at 257. 
 103. See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 
(5th Cir. 1998). 
 104. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law 
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most labor 
and employment laws assume a paradigmatic relationship between an ‘employer’ and 
‘employee.’ The employer in this model contracts directly with an individual employee to 
perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer's actual or potential 
supervision over the employee's method, manner, time and place of performance. This model 
describes most workers well enough, but there has always been a large pool of workers in 
alternative relationships with recipients of services. Some workers are ‘independent 
contractors’ who contract to perform specific tasks or achieve particular results, but who retain 
independence and self-management over their performance.”). 
 105. Stone, Legal Protections, supra note 101, at 257-58. 
 106. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One 
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 354 n.327 (2001). 
 107. Id. at 299-300.  
 108. Id. at 298 (“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law encourages ambiguity. 
On the one hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment 
relationship. On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are 
plausibly not employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable ‘non-employee’ 
classification. It is not uncommon to find employees and putative contractors sitting side by 
side, performing the same work without any immediately visible distinguishing characteristics. 
And the trend of the working world is toward greater complexity and variation, driven partly 
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or at least shape, these disputes over worker classification.109 In the 
largest of these suits, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,110 over 
160,000 drivers for the popular ridesharing service were certified as a 
class to seek employee status and redress, under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), for minimum wages and overtime pay.111 
Throughout the litigation, the judges in the Northern District of 
California struggled to characterize these working relationships within 
the “on/off” toggle of employee status.112 The case was settled.113  
1. Litigation in the United States 
 In the United States, recent cases have planted the seeds for 
inconsistent holdings about the status of gig economy workers. For 
example, two federal trial courts reached opposing conclusions about 
employment status despite the cases involving the same company, the 
same platform business model, and the same way of structuring the 
work relationship. In Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia allowed a case 
involving respondeat superior liability of Uber to move forward.114 In 
that case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been stabbed by an Uber 
driver who had been behaving erratically.115 In responding to Uber’s 
motion to dismiss the case, the court noted its skepticism about Uber’s 
claim that its workers were all independent contractors, thus absolving 
it of liability for wrongs that were committed in the furtherance of 
Uber’s business.116 In about the same time period, the United States 
 
 109. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 584-85. 
 110. 311 F.R.D. 547, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 111. Id. at 550-51. 
 112. Again, this has been a longstanding problem. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employment 
Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (“The new 
ways of working, that I believe challenge normal legal analyses, include such new relations of 
employment as temporary employment placed by an agency and part-time employment 
rendered by people who have no other employer but are treated as contingent workers without 
benefits or implicit promises. They also include ways of working that are not, technically, 
‘employment’ relations under any statute: independent contractors, free-lancers, consultants, 
and people out of the labor market after downsizing or other elimination of former career 
jobs.”). 
113 UBER CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, https://www.uberlitigation.com/ (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2019). 
 114. 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 234, 238 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 115. Id. at 227. 
116 Memorandum Opinion at 14, Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., (No. 15-257 
(JEB)) (“In sum, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that [the driver] 
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Razak 
v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a decision under the FLSA minimum wage 
and hour law.117 Looking primarily at the control test, the court decided 
that because the Uber drivers could work as much or as little as they 
wanted, they looked more like independent contractors.118 The court 
also discussed entrepreneurial activities and that Uber drivers 
shouldered the risk of profit or loss, which also made them look more 
like independent contractors.119  
 Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court handed down the 
decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court.120 While 
not an on-demand economy case, the California decision 
fundamentally changed the test for determining employee status 
throughout the state.121 In Dynamex, the court established the so-called 
ABC test, which states that a business wanting to classify workers as 
independent contractors must satisfy three elements: 
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in 
connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for 
the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs 
work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and 
(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work 
performed for the hiring entity.122  
While all of these seem difficult for Uber to meet, probably the most 
difficult and fatal element for Uber—and companies like it—will be 
prong B. To date, Uber has had little luck convincing courts that it is a 
software company.123 Courts have recognized that Uber is in the 
business of providing transportation, and that drivers are an integral 
part of shuttling passengers from one location to another.124 While the 
matter may be indeterminate now, under the new expansive ABC test 
 
 117. No. CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018). 
 118. Id. at *16. 
 119. Id. at *17. 
 120. 416 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2018). 
 121. Noam Scheiber, Gig Economy Business Model Dealt a Blow in California Ruling, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/04/30/business/economy/gig-economy- 
ruling.html.  
 122. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 7. 
 123. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Uber 
is no more a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’ because it 
uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a ‘technology company’ because it uses 
computers and robots to manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a ‘technology 
company’ because it uses modern irrigation techniques to grow its sugar cane.”). 
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in California, the most likely outcome will be that Uber drivers are 
employees. Indeed, in Bill AB-5, the California legislature codified the 
ABC test, solidifying the Dynamex decision into statute.125   
2. Litigation Within the European Union  
 The gig economy model only gained momentum later in the 
European Union, and as such, the litigation about employee status was 
a few years behind the United States.126 However, EU jurisdictions are 
now grappling with the same set of difficult problems around employee 
misclassification that the U.S. courts have been struggling with for 
several years. A 2018 blog post by Valerio De Stefano discussed the gig 
economy litigations across Europe and the reasoning of the courts 
deciding the cases, which are being decided inconsistently.127 This 
initial round of litigation has resulted in uncertainty and confusion. 
Some tribunals have found gig workers to be employees and others 
have found them to be independent contractors.128 Making matters 
more complicated is that some EU jurisdictions have a third category 
of “dependent contractor” or “self-employed worker,” which can make 
classification lawsuits even more complicated.129  
 One of the first cases in Europe that received a great deal of 
attention was Aslam v. Uber, in which the London Employment 
Tribunal ruled that the Uber drivers bringing the case were “workers,” 
an intermediate status between employee and independent 
contractor.130 The Tribunal noted that Uber had imposed a great number 
of conditions on the drivers, managed and instructed the drivers 
through the cellphone app, and overall, controlled the drivers’ working 
conditions.131 The United Kingdom’s Employment Appeals Tribunal 
 
 125. John Myers et al., Newsom Signs Bill Rewriting California Employment Law, 
Limiting Use of Independent Contractors, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/ 
california/story/2019-09-18/gavin-newsom-signs-ab5-employees0independent-contractors-
california.  
 126. Compare Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 584-85 
(listing American cases), with De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17 (listing European 
cases).  
 127. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17; see also Ruiz, supra note 23 (listing 
court cases across various jurisdictions). 
 128. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.  
 129. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 636 (comparing systems of worker classification 
in Canada, Italy, Spain, and the United States). 
 130. [2016] EW Misc B68, [97] (ET) (28 Oct. 2016), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/ 
Misc/2016/B68.html. 
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upheld the decision on appeal.132 Courts in other European nations have 
also held on-demand workers to be employees. In Belgium, the 
Administrative Commission for the Governance of the Employment 
Relationship decided that Deliveroo food-delivery bicycle riders were 
employees under Belgian law.133 In its decision, the Commission noted 
that Deliveroo riders do not control their working time, since they must 
reserve their work slots more than one week in advance.134 In Spain, 
the Labor Inspectorates of Valencia and Madrid determined that 
Deliveroo and Glovo drivers were employees because they work in 
conditions of subordination to the platform.135 
 Contrast these outcomes with the recent decision of the Labor 
Tribunal of Turin, Italy, which rejected a claim from Foodora delivery 
riders who sought employee classification.136 The Tribunal relied 
heavily on the fact that the workers had control over their schedules 
and could decide when they wanted to work.137 As such, the Tribunal 
found that these riders were not employees.138 A similar argument 
convinced the Paris Court of Appeal, which found that a Deliveroo 
rider was not an employee, in part because the riders could choose their 
shifts and decide when to work.139 The reasoning about work flexibility 
 
 132. Id. [106].  
 133. Commission Administrative de règlement de la relation de travail (CRT) 
[Administrative Commission for the Settlement of Work Relationship] Feb. 23, 2018, No. 116-
FR-20180209 [hereinafter Commission Administrative (Belg.)], http://commissiearbeids 
relaties.belgium.be/docs/dossier-116-fr.pdf, (Belg.); see also Les Coursiers Deliveroo Sont de 
Faux Indépendant, Selon la CRT, TRENDS (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:58 AM), http://trends.levif.be/ 
economie/entreprises/les-coursiers-deliveroo-sont-de-faux-independant-selon-la-crt/article-
normal-817847.html? (describing the court’s decision). 
 134. Commission Administrative (Belg.), supra note 133, at 7. 
 135. S. Juz. Soc., June 1, 2018 (No. 244/2018), https://adriantodoli.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/06/documento-2.pdf (Spain); see also África Semprún & Javier Romera, La 
Inspección de Trabajo Acorrala a Deliveroo y Glovo por los Falsos Autónomos, 
ELECONOMISTA.ES (Feb. 5, 2018, 7:34 AM), http://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/ 
noticias/8914943/02/18/Trabajo-acorrala-a-Deliveroo-y-Glovo-por-los-falsos-autonomos. 
html (describing labor inspections of “false autonomous” workers).  
 136. Vincenzo Di Gennaro & Attilio Pavone, Italian Labour Court Hands Down 
Landmark Decision on Foodora Case with Potentially Far-Reaching Implications for Any 
Company Active in Italy’s Growing Gig Economy, GLOBAL WORKPLACE INSIDER BLOG (May 
24, 2018), https://www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/2018/05/italian-labour-court-hands-down- 
landmark-decision-on-foodora-case-with-potentially-far-reaching-implications-for-any-
company-active-in-italys-growing-gig-economy/; see also Avvocati Giuslavoristi Italiani, 
Motivazioni Caso Foodora—La Sintesi, LINKEDIN (May 7, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/ 
pulse/motivazioni-caso-foodora-la-sintesi-agi/ (describing the court’s decision).  
 137. Gennaro & Pavone, supra note 136. 
 138. Avvocati Giuslavoristi Italiani, supra note 136. 
 139. Cour d’appel de Paris [CA] [Paris Court of Appeal], Paris, Chambre 2, Nov. 9, 
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and selection of shifts also convinced the Paris Conseil des 
Prud’hommes, a lower judicial body in France, which held that an Uber 
driver was not an employee.140 Ultimately, these precedents illustrate 
different approaches to dealing with national law and the classification 
of on-demand workers. As these cases wend their way through 
employment tribunals and national courts, the differing outcomes and 
confusing conclusions will only multiply. 
IV. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PLATFORM 
ECONOMY: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE JURISDICTIONS 
“[I]t only takes two facing mirrors to construct a labyrinth.” 
—Jorge Luis Borges141 
 To date, the cases about employment in the gig economy have not 
delved into the issues surrounding jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
conflict of law in any depth.142 In part, that is because there has not yet 
been enough law developed to enable the parties to make strategic 
decisions about where to bring suit, or to ask courts to apply a particular 
jurisdiction’s law. Without knowing how any particular jurisdiction 
will rule, the parties can only guess about which legal system might 
result in a favorable ruling. Some jurisdictions generally have more 
favorable labor and employment laws, or have precedents that strongly 
favor employee rather than independent contractor status, which might 
influence a decision about where a plaintiff might want to bring suit.143 
 
Reconnu Salarié, L’EXPRESS L’ENTERPRISE (Nov. 17, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://lentreprise. 
lexpress.fr/rh-management/droit-travail/la-justice-deboute-un-livreur-de-deliveroo-qui-voulait-
etre-reconnu-salarie_1961503.html (describing the court’s decision).  
 140. Conseil de Prud’hommes de Paris [CP] [Paris Labor Court], Paris, Jan. 29, 2018, 
No. RG:F 16/11460; see also Clément Bohic, Les Chauffeurs Uber Salariés: C’est Non Pour 
les Prud’hommes, ITESPRESSO (Feb. 9, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.itespresso.fr/chauffeurs- 
uber-salaries-non-prud-hommes-183124.html (describing the court’s decision). 
 141. JORGE LUIS BORGES, Nightmares, in SEVEN NIGHTS 33 (Eliot Weinberger trans., 
Faber & Faber 1984) (“I remember seeing, in the house of Dora de Alvear in the Belgrano 
district, a circular room whose walls and doors were mirrored, so that whoever entered the 
room found himself at the center of a truly infinite labyrinth.”). 
 142. The litigations so far have treated the employee status question as one of national 
or state law. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547, 547 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter 
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Yuki Noguchi, Gig 
Economy Renews Debate over Whether Contractors Are Really Employees, NPR (Mar. 7, 
2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/07/589840595/gig-economy-renews-debate-
over-whether-contractors-are-really-workers (discussing how freelancers and contract workers 
do not have access to traditional benefits). 
 143. See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1061 (noting that the plaintiffs contended that 
California’s laws are more worker-protective than those of other states); Kia Kokalitcheva, 
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In addition, apart from the Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc. case, most of the 
litigation to date has concerned platforms that facilitate work in the real 
world, i.e., transportation, home repair, cleaning, or odd jobs.144 As 
such, the workers have tended to bring suit based on where they live 
and perform their work.145  
 This is the not the case with the three examples that were set out 
in the Introduction. Upwork could be sued in many of the jurisdictions 
in which it has recruited requesters and workers. Calculating the 
permutations of the different countries involved in this interaction is 
practically a matter of factorial combinatorics.146 TaskRabbit platform 
workers in the United Kingdom, who work for a platform based in the 
United States but owned by a Swedish company, might have a very 
difficult time figuring out what their minimum wage would be. Sweden 
has no minimum wage.147 What about the workers in refugee camps 
performing piecework computer tasks for a multinational company 
with a platform based in yet another country and end users in many 
nations? This is an incredibly difficult problem. 
 These difficult issues will soon become important in future 
litigation and policy discussions. Conflicts of law is a “sleeper,”148 a 
dormant and unexpected legal issue for the gig economy now, that will 
have considerable significance in the future. In the three- to five-year 
period following the publication of this Article, there will be indicators 
or rough outlines of different national approaches to the labor and 
employment law problems the gig economy has provoked. In some 
instances, the response will be the work of courts, either stretching 
current laws to cover the gig economy, or declining to do so on the 
 
fortune.com/2015/10/14/labor-lawyer-california-license (stating that the judge informed 
prominent plaintiffs’ attorney Shannon Liss-Riordan that she wasn’t eligible for admission pro 
hac vice in California because she “regularly engaged in substantial legal activities in 
California.”). 
 144. See Cherry, Digital Transformation of Work, supra note 11, at 584-85. But see No. 
12-cv-05524-JST, 2016 WL 304747, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (considering a platform that 
facilitates online work, such as verifying business listings). 
 145. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (stating that the plaintiffs are Pennsylvania drivers who filed the lawsuit in 
Pennsylvania).  
 146. Cf. Brett Berry, Combinations vs Permutations, MEDIUM (June 14, 2017), https:// 
medium.com/i-math/combinations-permutations-fa7ac680f0ac (explaining how to calculate 
combinations and permutations). 
 147. Per Skedinger, Sweden: A Minimum Wage Model in Need of Modification? 1 (Res. 
Inst. of Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 774, 2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
download?doi=10.1.1.493.6418&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 148. Sleeper, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sleeper 
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grounds that it is beyond the bounds of existing regulation. In the 
ensuing years, the issues will make their way up to the appellate courts. 
In other instances, legislatures will be key actors, either passing laws to 
provide courts with clear guidance as to appropriate approaches or to 
correct approaches where legislatures disagree with the courts. 
Legislatures may enact “fixes” to bring gig workers within the ambit 
of existing laws, to repeal the effect of judicial decisions they do not 
like, or to pass legislation specifically to regulate the gig economy. 
 Based on the preliminary rulings we have seen, a high degree of 
divergence is likely in various national final rulings.149 Because the 
decision about classification is like “being ‘handed a square peg and 
[being] asked to choose between two round holes,’” some jurisdictions 
will decide that gig workers are employees, and some will decide that 
they are independent contractors.150 Where a legal system recognizes 
an intermediate category, that third category is also a permissible 
choice.151 It is at that point that the conflicts-of-law problems will 
emerge. In selecting a place to bring suit, workers will try to choose the 
jurisdiction with the highest or most favorable labor standards. 
Likewise, platforms could also attempt to choose a favorable forum, 
either by writing clauses into their online terms or by arguing for 
removal.152 Choosing regulation by searching for the jurisdiction that 
provides either a “race to the bottom” or “race to the top” seems more 
like a jurisdictional shell game than a coherent regulatory approach.  
 While so far this Article has been somewhat abstract in its 
discussion of the conflict-of-law and choice-of-law rules, the following 
discussion is designed to cover three jurisdictions that have important 
connections with crowdwork: California, the European Union, and 
India. These issues are described only in brief. While the application to 
crowdwork platforms has not occurred yet, the analysis below is 
intended as a starting point. 
A. United States: California’s Governmental Interest Approach 
 An analysis of California law is included because many of the 
well-known on-demand platforms originated in Silicon Valley and 
 
 149. See De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17. 
 150. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 681 (quoting Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 
1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015)); see De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17.  
 151. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 637. 
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many platforms continue to operate there.153 Further, many platforms 
were tested in the San Francisco Bay area, and so California is home to 
many requesters and on-demand workers as well.154 The focus here is 
on California and not the entire United States because conflict-of-law 
rules vary between the states.155 The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 
of Laws has only been adopted by roughly twenty states; some states 
continue to follow the Restatement (First), while others take a common 
law approach.156 This problem with lack of uniformity can be 
sidestepped by focusing on the conflicts laws of California. 
 The focus on California also makes sense as many gig economy 
cases have been brought in California, although most of those cases 
have either settled or are in the process of settling.157 Currently, there is 
no consensus in California law about whether platform workers are 
employees or independent contractors.158 As noted in Part III, the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Dynamex sets out the ABC test, 
which contains a strong presumption in favor of employment status.159 
With this change in the controlling precedent, it is safe to assume that 
under California law, a substantial fraction of on-demand workers will 
be found to be employees. From a worker’s perspective, California is 
also a jurisdiction within the United States that has some of the more 
worker-friendly sets of labor and employment laws. For example, 
noncompetition clauses are not enforceable in California, unlike their 
status in most other states.160 As another example, California’s Unruh 
Act extends antidiscrimination protection to LGBT workers, whereas 
the federal law has not yet done so.161 As a third example, California is 
also phasing in a state minimum wage that is higher than the amount 
 
 153. Tracey Lien, On-Demand Business Models Have Put Some Startups on Life 
Support, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/ 
la-fi-tn-end-of-on-demand-snap-story.html. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 72 (5th ed. 2010). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy: Settlements Leave Labor Issues Unsettled, 
LAW360 (May 5, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/791341/gig-economy-
settlements-leave-labor-issues-unsettled.  
 158. Lydia DePillis, California Ruling Puts Pressure on Uber, Lyft and Other Gig 
Economy Employers, CNN MONEY (May 3, 2018, 1:22 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/ 
05/01/news/economy/california-gig-employer-ruling/index.html. 
 159. 416 P.3d 1, 29, 30, 35 (Cal. 2018). 
 160. Glynn, supra note 50; Lester & Ryan, supra note 50; Moffat, supra note 50, at 
941-43. 
 161. See CAL. DEP’T FAIR EMP’T & HOUS., DFEH-U01P-ENG, UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS 
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under the FLSA, with the ultimate goal of a $15 hourly wage by 
2023.162 
1. Conflict of Laws: Governmental Interest Approach 
 California courts apply the governmental interest approach and 
comparative impairment analysis when resolving conflict-of-laws 
issues.163 The governmental interest approach involves three steps. 
First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the 
potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in 
question is the same or different.164 Second, if there is a difference, the 
court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own 
law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether 
a “true conflict” exists.165 Third, if the court finds a true conflict, it 
carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of each 
jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law “to determine 
which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were 
subordinated to the policy of the other state” and then ultimately applies 
“the law of the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its 
law were not applied.”166 This last step is a comparative impairment 
analysis.167 
 Two recent cases concerning conflicts of employment law are 
illustrative of the approach and provide some guidance for application 
of the tests to crowdwork. In Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 
 
 162. Labor Comm’rs Office, Minimum Wage, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. REL. (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm. 
 163. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (citing 
Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967)). For an excellent summary of choice-of-law and 
conflict-of-law rules in California, see Michael H. Hoffheimer, California’s Territorial Turn 
in Choice of Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 167 (2015). 
 164. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922. The California government interest approach owes a 
heavy debt to the judicial opinions of California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor. See 
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 629-89 (1963). See generally 
Herma Hill Kay, Chief Justice Traynor and Choice of Law Theory, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 747 
(1984) (recognizing Justice Traynor’s contributions to the field).  
 165. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922; see also WILLIAM LINDSLEY, 12 CAL. JUR. 3D § 30, 
Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (“Although the two potentially concerned states have 
different laws, when only one of two states related to a case has a legitimate interest in the 
application of its law and policy and the other has none, the law of the interested state should 
be applied. A true conflict of laws arises only if the laws of the two jurisdictions differ and each 
state has a legitimate interest in having its law applied.”); Harold W. Horowitz, The Law of 
Choice of Law in California—A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719, 743-47 (1974) 
(explaining “false-false conflicts”). 
 166. Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976). 
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the court held that the privacy laws of California and Georgia differed, 
conflicted, and the failure to apply California’s privacy law would have 
impaired California’s interest more severely than the application of 
California law would have impaired Georgia’s interests.168 In Kearney, 
the Atlanta-based branch of Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) recorded the 
telephone conversations between SSB’s employees and California 
clients without the California clients’ knowledge or consent.169 Under 
California’s invasion of privacy statute, all parties must have 
knowledge and consent to the recording of a telephone conversation.170 
However, under Georgia’s privacy statute, only one party in the 
conversation needs to give prior consent to the recording of the 
telephone conversation.171 The court reasoned that both California and 
Georgia had a legitimate interest in the application of its law.172 
California had an interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens. 
Georgia’s privacy statute can be reasonably interpreted to establish the 
ground rules under which persons in Georgia may act in regards to 
recording private conversations and therefore seeks to protect the 
liability of persons or businesses who acted in reasonable reliance on 
Georgia law.173  
 Accordingly, the court concluded that the case presented a true 
conflict.174 After a true conflict is identified by the court, the 
comparative impairment approach seeks to determine which state’s 
interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the 
policy of the other state.175 However, the comparative impairment 
approach is not a weighing test because a “balancing” of conflicting 
state policies creates federalism concerns.176 Instead, the comparative 
impairment process attempts to accommodate conflicting state policies 
and achieve the “maximum attainment” of underlying governmental 
 
 168. 137 P.3d at 917. 
 169. Id. at 918. 
 170. Id. at 929. 
 171. Id. at 932. 
 172. Id. at 933. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.; see JOHN K. DIMUGNO & PAUL E.B. GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW 
HANDBOOK § 17:2, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019). True conflicts differ from “false 
conflicts.” Brainerd Currie termed a “false conflict” as “a situation in which only one state had 
an actual interest in having its law applied.” DIMUGNO & GLAD, supra.   
 175. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 933 (citing Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 
(Cal. 1976). 
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purpose.177 The Kearney court looked to the legislative history of the 
invasion of privacy statute’s enactment to determine the statute’s 
principle purpose.178 Since 1967, the California legislature has 
continually modified and added to the invasion of privacy statutory 
scheme.179 Additionally, the California courts have repeatedly invoked 
and vigorously enforced the invasion of privacy provisions.180 
Accounting for the many national and international firms that have 
headquarters, offices, or telephone operators in California, the Kearney 
court reasoned that the failure to enforce California’s invasion of 
privacy provision would substantially undermine the protection 
afforded by the statute.181 By contrast, applying California law to a 
Georgia business’s recording of telephone calls between its employees 
and California customers will not severely impair Georgia’s interests 
because California law does not totally prohibit a party to a telephone 
call from recording the call but rather prohibits only the undisclosed 
recording of telephone conversations.182 Accordingly, the court held 
that “California law should apply in determining whether the alleged 
secret recording of telephone conversations at issue in this case 
constitutes an unlawful invasion of privacy” because California’s 
interests would be severely impaired if its law were not applied, and 
Georgia’s interest would not be significantly impaired if California law 
rather than Georgia law were applied.183 
 In Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., the Court held that the California 
Labor Code applied to overtime work performed in California for a 
California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs.184 In Sullivan, 
former non-California resident employees sued Oracle alleging 
misclassification as “exempt” from overtime and sought unpaid 
 
 177. Id. (quoting Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 728 (Cal. 1978)); 
see also Note, Comparative Impairment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the Conflict 
of Laws, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1982) (“The spirit of our Constitution and the values 
underlying our federal system sanction and encourage the separate development of policy and 
law in each state in accordance with its own environment. If this uniquely federalist value—
maximum attainment of policy objectives by each state—is itself a systemic policy whose 
promotion is important to each state, the comparative impairment principle follows quite 
naturally.”). 
 178. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 934. 
 179. Id. at 935. 
 180. Id. at 934.  
 181. Id. at 936.  
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 937.  
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overtime compensation.185 The employees contended California’s 
overtime law governed their work in the state of California, whereas 
Oracle contended the laws of the plaintiffs’ home states, Colorado and 
Arizona, governed.186 The relevant laws differed between the three 
states because California law had an additional overtime compensation 
provision increasing the rate of pay to twice the regular rate, for work 
in excess of eight hours, on the seventh workday.187 Unlike California 
law, neither Colorado law nor Arizona law required double pay.188  
 The California Supreme Court reasoned that neither Colorado nor 
Arizona expressed any “interest in disabling their residents from 
receiving the full protection of California overtime law when working 
[in California], or in requiring their residents to work side-by-side with 
California residents in California for lower pay.”189 “Consequently, 
neither Colorado nor Arizona ha[d] a legitimate interest in shielding 
Oracle from the requirements of California wage law as to work 
performed [in California]” because Oracle is a multistate operation.190 
“[A] company that conducts business in numerous states ordinarily is 
required to make itself aware of and comply with the law of a state in 
which it chooses to do business.”191 Even if a genuine “true conflict” 
existed, permitting nonresidents to work in California without the 
protection of California’s overtime law would have sacrificed “the 
state’s important public policy goals of protecting health and safety and 
preventing the evils associated with overwork.”192 “Colorado overtime 
law expressly d[id] not apply outside the state’s boundaries, and 
Arizona ha[d] no overtime law.”193 In this situation, the California 
Supreme Court held that the California Labor Code applied to overtime 
work performed in California for a California-based employer by out-
of-state plaintiffs.194  
 One last point about why Sullivan is an important case. In the last 
part of its opinion, the court declined to extend California overtime pay 
provisions to work performed by the plaintiffs for Oracle in states other 
 
 185. Id. at 239. 
 186. Id. at 244.  
 187. Id. at 245. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 246.  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. (quoting Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 920 (Cal. 
2006)). 
 192. Id. at 247. 
 193. Id.  
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than California. The discussion is limited to the last section of the 
opinion, and it is fact-specific, noting that the plaintiffs were trying to 
reinstate time-barred FLSA claims as restitution claims under 
California’s unfair competition law.195 Nonetheless, the court noted the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of laws, and noted no 
intent to overcome that presumption in the Unfair Competition Law 
(UCL) by the California legislature.196 This was enough to prompt one 
commentator to note that this decision and ones like it marked a return 
of California to territorial application of rules, with a tendency to apply 
“the law of the place where the events occurred” rather than apply the 
governmental interest approach.197  
2. Choice of Law 
 In addition to the default rules of the governmental interest 
approach and the comparative impairment test set out above, California 
follows the rules set out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of 
Laws.198 “[W]hen the parties intend the law of a certain state to govern 
a dispute, that intention is usually respected. . . . In the absence of 
countervailing public policy considerations, agreements of the parties 
as to the applicable law are enforced.”199 However, an escape clause 
qualified this statement. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
states as follows: 
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
rights and duties will be applied, . . . unless . . . application of the law of 
the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state 
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue . . . .200  
In determining which state has a “materially greater interest” in the 
resolution of an issue,  
court[s] may consider (1) the place of contracting, (2) the place of 
negotiation of the contract, (3) the place of performance, (4) the location 
of the subject matter of the contract, (5) the domicile, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, 
 
 195. Id. at 248. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Hoffheimer, supra note 163, at 241-42. 
 198. See id. at 168 n.4. 
 199. Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Techs., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 92 (S.D. Cal. 1987). 
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(6) the impact of the transaction on the state or its citizens, and (7) the 
extent to which the state has sought to regulate the issue.201 
 Three cases are particularly relevant for the crowdwork 
discussion. In Hammerl v. Acer Europe, S.A., the plaintiff’s 
employment contract contained a choice-of-law clause.202 The plaintiff 
sought to bring his claim under the California Labor Code whereas the 
defendant, Acer Europe, sought to enforce the contractual choice-of-
law provision and have Swiss law govern the dispute.203 The court 
stated that the defendant’s American subsidiary corporation, Acer 
America, exercised a degree of control over the plaintiff’s employment 
duties, compensation, and benefits to the extent that it would be 
reasonable to consider the plaintiff an employee of Acer America and, 
therefore, eligible to state a claim for violations of the California Labor 
Code.204  
 In Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., the court 
declined to enforce the parties’ contractual choice-of-law provision 
because the interests of the forum state, California, were “materially 
greater” than those of the chosen state, Maryland.205 In this case, a 
Maryland corporation sought to enforce a noncompetition covenant 
within a consultant’s contract after a California corporation recruited 
and hired the consultant.206 The court was convinced that “California 
ha[d] a materially greater interest than d[id] Maryland in the 
application of its law to the parties’ dispute, and that California’s 
interests would be more seriously impaired if its policy were 
subordinated to the policy of Maryland” because California had 
consistently expressed a public policy “ensur[ing] that every citizen 
shall retain the right to pursue any lawful employment and enterprise 
of their choice.”207 The case of In re Gault South Bay Litigation, which 
involved an Indiana corporation’s attempt to enforce a noncompetition 
clause, had a similar impact.208 The conflicts-of-law analysis required 
 
 201. In re Gault S. Bay Litig., No. C 07-04659 JW, 2008 WL 4065843, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187, 188). 
 202. No. C 08-4754 JF (RS), 2009 WL 30130, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 203. Id. at *3. 
 204. Id. at *7. 
 205. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 206. Id. at 75-76.  
 207. Id. at 85-86 (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).  
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the court to apply California law to the agreement, holding the non-
compete provision of the agreement to be void.209  
 Finally, Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. involved a 
contractual mandatory arbitration provision within an employment 
agreement.210 The plaintiffs alleged various wage and hour violations 
under the California Labor Code.211 The employer, a Texas-based 
corporation, sought to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision 
under Texas law whereas the plaintiffs sought to argue 
unconscionability using California public policy.212 The court held the 
California law enforceable because enforcing Texas law would be 
contrary to the “fundamental policy” of California’s interest to protect 
California-based workers.213 These cases seem to indicate that rather 
than accepting a choice-of-law clause written by an employer at face 
value, California courts are willing to undertake a more searching 
review, looking at the governmental and public policy interests 
involved. 
B European Union 
 The European Union is included in this study because of its large 
number of requesters and workers performing gig work, as well as a 
substantial number of platforms that are either hosted or EU-owned.214 
In addition, European countries have had a long history of dealing with 
cross-border workers and posted workers.215 As background to this 
discussion, it is important to note that a number of issues, such as 
worker safety, maximum hours, or employment discrimination are in 
many nations in the European Union considered “public law,” enforced 
by a national governmental authority.216 Each such authority is 
responsible for either taking action (or not) to enforce the rules within 
its territorial boundaries.217  
 
 209. Id. at *5. 
 210. 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).  
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 171. 
 213. Id. at 185.  
 214. Cf. De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17 (noting litigation involving 
crowdworking platforms in the European Union). 
 215. See generally Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of 
Services, 1997 O.J. (L 18) (dealing with posted workers). 
 216. See Franzen, supra note 43, at 245. 
 217. Id. at 246-47 (“As a rule—this is universally accepted—the application of these 





2019] A GLOBAL SYSTEM OF WORK 33 
 
 Some components of the employment relationship, however, are 
considered a subset of contractual matters, and these are classified as 
private law.218 As such, these matters are generally left up to the 
individual employee to claim his or her rights through grievance 
procedures or the courts.219 The rules of jurisdiction over such claims 
are set out in the Brussels I regulation. Section 5 of the Brussels I 
Regulation allows employees who act as claimants to commence 
proceedings in a number of places: in the courts of the employer’s 
domicile, in the courts of the habitual place of work, and in the courts 
of the engaging place of business.220 As such, Brussels I is quite 
permissive in where an employee can bring a claim, with the ultimate 
intent of furthering employee protection.221  
 Private international law problems are set out in the Rome I 
Regulation,222 in which the European Union adopted an extremely 
comprehensive and sophisticated system for dealing with private 
international law problems and labor and employment.223 Based on the 
Rome Convention of 1980,224 the Rome I Regulation has as its goal a 
uniform approach that will yield predictable outcomes throughout the 
member states.225 There is also a special section, article 8, specifically 
 
The Conflict of Law norm is unilateral. For example, the German factory inspectorate . . . is 
only responsible and German safety regulations only apply if the work is done in Germany.”). 
Collective norms pertaining to industrial relations do not easily fit into the public law/private 
law dichotomy. Id. at 246. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC). The regulation also 
allows for a dispute arising out of an employer’s branch or agency to take place in the courts 
in those places, and on a counterclaim, the court in which the original claim is pending. Id. 
 221. See Grušić, supra note 51 (noting that even though Brussels I jurisdictional rules 
were enacted to protect workers, recent decisions had not been employee friendly). 
 222. Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC). For more on the history 
of the enactment of Rome I, see Franzen, supra note 43, at 247. 
 223. See, e.g., MIRIAM KULLMANN, ENFORCEMENT OF LABOUR LAW IN CROSS-BORDER 
SITUATIONS: A LEGAL STUDY OF THE EU’S INFLUENCE ON THE DUTCH, GERMAN, AND SWEDISH 
ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS 4 (Sebastian Kortmann & Dennis Faber eds., 2015) (discussing 
enforcement issues that arise around posted workers in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden); Sebastian Krebber, Conflict of Laws in Employment in Europe, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 501, 503 (2000).  
 224. The 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations is the 
predecessor law. Before the Rome Convention, traditional approaches to continental European 
private international law of contracts had as their object finding the “seat” of the dispute. See 
generally FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE 
LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME (2d. ed. 1880) (nineteenth-century 
treatise on conflict of laws). For tort law, private international law is set out in the Rome II 
Regulation. Council Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC). 
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dealing with employment contracts.226 Rome I attempts to respect the 
parties’ choice of the applicable law in their contracts, reinforce 
predictability and stability, and allow some discretion to default rules 
to favor the nation with the closest connection to the contract to supply 
the rules.227  
1. Problems with Characterization 
 In his book chapter, Professor Wolfgang Kozak sets out some 
thoughts as to how the private international law issues created by 
crowdwork might be treated in the European Union.228 Most of 
Kozak’s discussion, however, focuses on the preliminary question of 
how to characterize the relationship between the worker and the 
platform.229 So, if there is an employment contract, then you would use 
article 8 to analyze the problem. If, on the other hand, the contract 
between the worker and the platform is not an employment contract, 
then it would receive the analysis specified for general contracts in 
article 4. The problem that gives Kozak a great deal of trouble is that if 
EU national systems are using different standards to decide if gig 
workers have employment contracts, there is no way to determine 
which article of the Rome Regulation to apply.230 The problem that 
Kozak ran into was, in effect, a type of difficult question of 
characterization.231 The Rome Regulation requires a determination 
about whether there is an employment contract, but such a 
determination of characterization232 is the very issue that is the conflict 
 
 226. Id. art. 8, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC). 
 227. VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 203. 
 228. Wolfgang Kozak, Crowdwork mit Auslandsbezug: Anwendbares Recht und 
Gerichsstände, in ARBEIT IN DER GIG-ECONOMY 305-19 (Doris Lutz & Martin Risak eds., 
2017) (Austria). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 6-7. Perhaps it is not an exact match but the issue 
could also be viewed as analogous to the limited doctrine of vorfrage (a German doctrine that 
roughly translates into English as “preliminary question”). The entire scenario provides a very 
difficult thought problem. Cf. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Garden of Forking Paths, in 
LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES & OTHER WRITINGS 19, 25 (Donald A. Yates trans., Donald 
A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., 1964) (1958) (“Before unearthing this letter, I had questioned 
myself about the ways in which a book can be infinite. I could think of nothing other than a 
cyclic volume, a circular one. A book whose last page was identical with the first, a book which 
had the possibility of continuing indefinitely.”). 
 232. Professor Louise Merrett describes the question of whether there is an employment 
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between the different legal systems.233 In essence, Kozak spends his 
chapter describing this very difficult problem of characterization and 
notes the questions it raises. 
 The analysis need not stop there, however. Kozak was correct to 
raise the issue of characterization, but that does not present an 
insurmountable bar to the analysis. Other parts of the Rome Regulation 
itself describe what to do in these types of infinite regress problems. 
For example, article 10 attempts to correct the characterization problem 
that comes up with contractual validity, noting that courts should decide 
the validity of a contract based on the law that would govern if it were 
found to be valid.234 Rather than get bogged down in this difficult 
characterization problem, the answer lies in setting out the alternatives 
and following them to their conclusions. What law would a worker 
suing a platform receive if they attempted to bring the case under article 
8, and alternately, what would the result be if they attempted to bring 
the case under article 4? The next subparts explore these two paths.  
2. Two Paths of the Rome Convention 
 Let us assume that the correct determination is to treat platform 
work as a contract of employment, and further let us assume that no 
choice of law has been set forth in the contract. In that instance, Rome 
I article 8 states, “[T]he contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually 
carries out his work in performance of the contract.”235 Thus a 
geographical location, that is, the habitual place of work, has 
considerable importance and gravity in making the determination of 
applicable law.236 Article 8 goes on to state that, when the habitual place 
of work cannot be determined, “the contract shall be governed by the 
law of the country where the place of business through which the 
employee was engaged is situated.”237 An escape clause is also 
included, and if it appears from the totality of the circumstances that 
 
 233. As discussed by Professor Geert van Calster, a vorfrage concern may arise when 
EU law may have “determined which applicable law is connected to a given legal category, 
however before one may apply it, one needs to decide on the actual existence of the category 
in the facts at issue.” VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 6.  
 234. Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 10(1), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC). 
 235. Id. art. 8(2), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC). 
 236. VAN CALSTER, supra note 28, at 216. The habitual place of employment would not 
be changed by temporary employment. Id. 
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the contract is more related with another country than those enumerated 
in the preceding sections, then the law of the other country will apply.238  
 If on the other hand, we say that the user and the platform have 
not entered a contract for employment, and we instead have a general 
contract, then the correct place to look is Rome I article 4(1). Under 
this section, “a contract for the provision of services shall be governed 
by the law of the country where the service provider has his habitual 
residence.”239 In case this is not a proper classification, then article 4(2) 
states that the contract shall be governed “by the law of the country 
where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the 
contract has his habitual residence.”240 Escape clauses also apply here, 
with Rome I article 4(3) and 4(4) noting that if it seems that the contract 
is more closely connected with another country then that country’s laws 
will apply.241 
 While it is true that habitual place of work might not be different 
than the worker’s place of residence, since most platform workers 
choose to work from their homes, this might be a distinction without a 
difference. In any event, it should not lead to an infinite regress problem 
as both article 4 and article 6 contain sufficient escape clauses that lead 
back to the idea of applying the country’s law that has the most 
connection to contract or the contract of employment, whichever we 
determine it to be. A larger impact might be felt because of specialized 
rules for employment contracts and choice of law, the rules for which 
are set out in the next subpart. 
3. Choice of Law 
 Just as in the United States, many employment contracts in the 
European Union contain a choice-of-law clause, so as to minimize 
transaction costs.242 These clauses can provide certainty, especially 
when a transaction has an international aspect.243 Pursuant to Rome I 
article 3, parties are free to specify in their contract the law that they 
would elect to apply to a dispute arising from the contract.244 The 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. art. 4(1)(b), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 11 (EC). 
 240. Id. art. 4(2), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 11 (EC).  
 241. Id. art. 4(3-4), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 11 (EC). 
 242. Eric A. Posner, The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The 
Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 261, 
261-62 (2013). 
 243. Id. 
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freedom of choice embraced by article 3 is expansive, even including 
the ability to choose the law of a country that is not part of the European 
Union.245 However, there is a countervailing concern, which is that the 
employer will forum-shop and through a choice-of-law clause, seek to 
dictate the choice of law unilaterally.246 Employees are recognized to 
have less bargaining power, and the concern is that choice-of-law 
provisions might work to their disadvantage.247 Therefore, the Rome 
Regulation instead seeks to set a “minimum standard of employment 
protection that cannot be undermined by the chosen law.”248    
 The Rome Regulation does this first by allowing the parties a 
choice of law in their contract under article 3.249 Then, in article 8, we 
are told that “[s]uch a choice of law may not, however, have the result 
of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by 
provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law 
that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable.”250 In short, 
the choice-of-law rules allow some flexibility, but not at the expense of 
worker rights. As noted by Franzen,  
[T]he idea of the principle of the most favourable law has achieved a 
breakthrough. Its purpose is to prevent abuse of the party autonomy as 
well as to allay misgivings about submitting the employment contract to 
an unfamiliar or underdeveloped local law. This theory involves the joint 
application of both legal systems. The employee is entitled to claim the 
norm more favourable to him.251 
C. India and Private International Law 
 This Article includes a summary of the Indian system for private 
international law because of the large numbers of Indian workers who 
perform platform work.252 For decades now, many companies have 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Case C-384/10, Jan Voogsgeerd v. Navimer S.A., 2011 E.C.R. I-13275; see also 
HEPPLE, supra note 38 (“The reason for the application of mandatory employment rules is the 
need to secure ‘protection for the party who from the socio-economic point of view is regarded 
as the weaker in the contractual relationship.’” (quoting Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, 
Council Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, at 25, 
1980 O.J. (C 282) (Oct. 31, 1980))).  
 247. Franzen, supra note 43, at 254 (“[T]he main idea is to protect the worker against 
an abuse of power by the employer. This fear of abuse with regard to the freedom of contract 
is enhanced with a growing distrust of large multinational enterprises (MNEs).”). 
 248. Krebber, supra note 223, at 527. 
 249. Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 10-11 (EC). 
 250. Id. art. 8(1), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 13 (EC). 
 251. Franzen, supra note 43, at 259. 
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outsourced their backroom operations and call centers to India and 
other parts of the global south.253 India is an attractive location for many 
businesses because there is a group of highly educated university 
graduates to perform skilled work at lower cost.254 India is also an 
attractive site to offshore because of its temporal advantage.255 While 
workers in other parts of the world are asleep, call centers in India can 
provide staffing to run round-the-clock technical support and customer 
service hotlines.256 While in some ways the virtual work engaged in by 
platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk seem new, in some ways they 
are just another step along a system of global offshoring that has been 
a trend over the past decades.257 While the labor and employment laws 
on the books in India provide protections for workers, enforcement of 
those laws on the ground continues to be a problem.258 A recent blog 
post commented on the state of gig workers in India, which confirms 
that as of the time of the writing of this Article, there had been no 
determination about the employment status of Uber drivers.259    
1. The Approach of “Proper Law” 
 Until 1952, Indian courts followed the common law British rules 
for private international law.260 After this date, courts in India were free 
to establish an alternate set of rules for conflict-of-law problems, but as 
a practical matter, the paucity of case law meant a continued reliance 
on the law of the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the law of the 
United States, Canada, and Australia.261 As a common law system, few 
 
 253. See Carolyn Penfold, Off-Shored Services Workers: Labour Law and Practice in 
India, 19 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 91, 91-92 (2009). 
 254. Id. at 92 (noting that India has the advantage of a “large, well-educated, English-
speaking work force”); see also Dev Nathan et al., Labour Practices in India 13-15 (ILO, Asia 
Pacific Working Paper Series, 2016) (noting increasing automation and degree requirements 
among engineering staff).  
 255. See Winifred R. Poster, Who’s on the Line? Indian Call Center Agents Pose as 
Americans for U.S.-Outsourced Firms, 46 INDUS. REL. 271, 274 (2007). 
 256. Id.  
 257. See generally OFFSHORING AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN REMOTE WORK (Jon C. 
Messenger & Naj Ghosheh eds., 2010) (examining the development of global offshoring). 
 258. Penfold, supra note 253, at 95. 
 259. Sonam Srivastava & Kushagra Srivastava, The Gig Economy Calls for 
Identification Within the Indian Labour Laws, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (July 4, 2019), https:// 
www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/07/gig-economy-calls-identification-within-
indian-labour-laws?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook. 
 260. See Indian & Gen. Inv. Tr. Ltd. v. Raja of Khalikote, AIR 1952 (Cal.) 508 (India). 
 261. F.E. NORONHA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INDIA: ADEQUACY OF PRINCIPLES 
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codifications of the private international law rules exist, and instead the 
bulk of principles have been set out in various judicial decisions, 
largely drawing on U.K. precedents.262 There are efforts in India in 
support of uniformity and unification, in the areas of insolvency, e-
commerce, international banking and secured credit, and international 
secured interests.263 To date, there are no specific scholarly works 
looking just at employment contracts and private international law. As 
such, one must look at the general rules for contracts and then 
extrapolate the principles to employment and labor, which are a subset 
of contracts. 
 Jurisdiction in the Indian courts is far-reaching and encompasses 
situations where a company “actually and voluntarily . . . carries on 
business, or personally works for gain.”264 The term “employee” is used 
in several pieces of legislation in India but is defined in different ways. 
For example, the 1948 Minimum Wages Act contains a circular 
definition, holding that an employee is “in a scheduled employment in 
respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed.”265 On the 
other hand, under the Payment of Gratuity Act of 1972, employee 
means “any person, other than an apprentice, employed on wages in 
any establishment.”266 
2. India and Conflicts in Employment and Labor Law 
 For conflicts of law involving contracts, India applies the “proper 
law” approach, a concept historically developed under U.K. law.267 The 
 
of the Indian Supreme Court and listing the foreign precedents compiled and used therein, 
which are overwhelming). 
 262. Y. Narasimha Rao & Ors. v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi & Anr., (1991) 2 SCR 821, 830 
(India); see also K.B. AGRAWAL & VANDANA SINGH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INDIA 
19 (2010) (“Presently, in Indian private international law, in some areas there is an absolute 
dearth of rules . . . . Indian courts have largely relied on English precedents, unfortunately even 
many years after Indian independence.”). 
 263. NORONHA, supra note 261, at 40-42. See generally SATISH CHANDRA, DOCUMENTS 
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) (reproducing texts of conventions and international 
treaties to which India is a party). 
 264. AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 229-30 (citing CODE CIV. PROC. § 20 
(1908), https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2191?view-type=browse&sam-handle=12 
3456789/1362 (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)); accord NORONHA, supra note 261, at 54-55 (citing 
U.S. precedents on minimum contacts for jurisdiction).  
 265. CHANDRA KUMAR JOHRI, LABOUR LAW IN INDIA 62 (2012). 
 266. Id. 
 267. It seems that India has continued to follow the “proper law approach,” despite the 
United Kingdom—as part of the European Union—following the rules for conflicts under the 
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“proper law” approach means that a court will use the law that the 
parties have expressly or impliedly chosen to govern their dispute.268 If 
the parties haven’t chosen a source of law or none is implied to the 
parties, then Indian courts will impute the law that has the “closest and 
most intimate connection with the contract.”269 The judge then 
approaches the question of the “proper law” from the perspective of the 
“reasonable man,” asking how a just and reasonable person would view 
the problem. Elements that an Indian court might consider would 
include:  
[T]he place where the contract was made, the form and object of the 
contract, the place of performance, the place of residence or business of 
the parties, reference to the courts having jurisdiction and such other links 
. . . to determine the system of law with which the transaction has its 
closest and most real connection.270  
Even though the parties’ choice of law will generally be respected by 
Indian courts, parties may not choose a foreign law to avoid the 
application of Indian law. For example, Indian prohibition of 
speculation in groundnut oil could not be circumvented through a 
choice-of-law clause invoking foreign law.271 
 With reference to employment contracts, the starting point would 
be to ascertain the intent of the parties as to their choice of law. If that 
is not possible, or no intent can be ascribed, an Indian court would then 
look at the law of the place with which the employment contract is most 
closely connected.272 In the case of an employment contract, 
 
the face of Brexit? This speculation is beyond the scope of this Article, and as such this Article 
will analyze the jurisdiction according to the common law proper law approach. 
 268. See PARAS DIWAN, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: INDIAN AND ENGLISH 506-08 
(3d ed. 1993); accord R.S. CHAVAN, INDIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1982) (“It 
means that parties to the contract are free to stipulate their terms of contract and also free to lay 
down the law by which their contract would be governed. The law by which the contract is 
intended by the parties to be governed is called ‘the proper law of contract.’”). 
 269. Nat’l Thermal Power Corp. v. Singer Co. & Ors., (1992) 3 SCR 106, 109 (India); 
Delhi Cloth & Gen. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Harnam Singh & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 590, 592 (India); 
NORONHA, supra note 261, at 72 (“[T]he expression refers to the substantive principles of the 
domestic law of the chosen system and not to its conflict of law[] rules.”). 
 270. NORONHA, supra note 261, at 74; see Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the 
Ship or Vessel “Assunzione” v. Owners of the Ship or Vessel “Assunzione” [1953] 1 All ER 
278 (Eng.); Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance & Gen. Mut. Life 
Assurance Soc’y Ltd., (1938) AC 224 (SC) 227-28 (N.Z.). 
 271. Se. Oil v. Messrs. Gorakhram Gokalchand, (1962) 64 Bom LR 113 (India). 
 272. AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 105; see also Schinas v. Nemazie, AIR 
1952 (Cal.) 859, 863-64 (describing the case of a seafarer, in which court noted its willingness 
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commentators have noted that a choice-of-law clause shall not have the 
result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded by the 
mandatory rules of the law of the state that would be applicable in the 
absence of a choice-of-law clause.273 In Indian labor and employment 
law, employment status is determined based on the employer’s ability 
to dismiss the employee.274 Realizing that there are few “truly” Indian 
sources and that the U.K. law itself may be in a state of flux due to 
Brexit, the following is a limited discussion of some of the issues that 
might arise in litigation around Indian crowdwork. 
D. Application of Choice of Law 
 A common issue to California, the European Union, and India 
(and, likely, many additional jurisdictions) is the use of choice-of-law 
clauses in contracts to specify which country’s labor and employment 
law will govern the relationship.275 But in all three systems, California, 
the European Union, and India, these choice-of-law clauses, which as 
a practical matter almost entirely are dictated by employers, will not be 
considered absolute.276 California’s application of the governmental 
interest test and precedent in the context of noncompetition agreements 
in fact seems to take a dim view of clauses selecting another state’s law 
when it results in fewer rights than the California Labor Code provides 
for workers.277 The European Union’s Rome Regulation allows choice-
of-law clauses, but not if it causes workers to lose the rights they would 
have enjoyed in the absence of such a clause.278 India’s approach is 
similarly in accord, holding that a choice-of-law clause would not be 
valid if it caused workers to lose rights they would have had under the 
default choice-of-law provisions.279   
 These are important points to keep in mind, because crowdwork 
environments are largely intermediated by and through standardized 
form contracts, the “terms and conditions” or “terms of service” put 
 
at the place where the contract was made or was to be performed, and if uncertain, to look at 
the lex fori). 
 273. AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 108. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Hammerl v. Acer Europe, S.A., No. C 08-4754 JF (RS), 2009 WL 30130, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009); Posner, supra note 242.  
 276. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); 
AGRAWAL & SINGH, supra note 262, at 105; Krebber, supra note 223.  
 277. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.  
 278. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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forth in order for a user to register an account.280 These terms and 
conditions are displayed in an online format, sometimes with scrollable 
texts. Some are presented in a format that requires the user to click “I 
agree” before continuing to use the site or platform. Courts in the 
United States have been reaching a consensus that the “click” signifies 
an objective assent or agreement to the form terms.281 Other sets of 
terms may be presented in a scattered way throughout the website or 
platform. Known as “browsewrap,” these kinds of contracts require no 
manifestation of assent and U.S. courts have been reluctant to enforce 
them.282  
 In fact, the “terms of service raise many of the same kinds of 
issues for online workers that terms of use and end user licensing 
agreements (EULAs) have long raised for software [user]s.”283 The 
2018 ILO study Digital Labor Platforms and the Future of Work notes 
that many platforms come along with terms and conditions that are 
largely unfriendly to workers.284 Many contain statements purporting 
to govern employment status and others may contain arbitration or 
choice-of-law clauses. Online workers may not even have seen the 
terms, or they may be presented in a piecemeal fashion, or during 
inopportune times.285 Even if the workers are able to access the terms 
and conditions that may not help them. The terms and conditions are 
often long and dense, with some running to over ten thousand words of 
legalese.286 Needless to say, just like busy consumers, most gig workers 
are trying to piece together a living and do not have the time to read all 
the terms. Even if they did, a feature of online adhesion contracts is 
their “take it or leave it” nature.287 Even if a worker did read the terms 
and conditions fully, any attempt to bargain would likely be futile.288   
 The terms of service for many on-demand platforms “contain a 
statement that the work is done on an ‘independent contractor’ basis 
 
 280. See BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 22-23.  
 281. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 840-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 282. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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 284. BERG ET AL., DIGITAL LABOUR PLATFORMS, supra note 73, at 22-24. 
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and that no employee benefits are designated or even desired.”289 That 
is sidestepping the fact that in most jurisdictions, such labels are not 
dispositive and that the true question of employee status is a matter to 
be decided by a legislature or court.290 Further questionable clauses in 
platform terms of service agreements may seek to impose mandatory 
binding arbitration.291 Others seek to limit class actions or impose 
choice-of-law provisions.   
 In a recent case from the United Kingdom’s Employment 
Tribunal about Uber, the tribunal analyzed the web of contracts 
between Uber and its drivers as well as Uber and its passengers in some 
depth.292 Regarding the former relationship, the Tribunal was extremely 
critical, noting as follows: 
[T]he terms on which Uber rely do not correspond with the reality of the 
relationship between the organisation and the drivers. Accordingly, the 
Tribunal is free to disregard them. As is often the case, the problem stems 
at least in part from the unequal bargaining positions of the contracting 
parties . . . . Many Uber drivers (a substantial proportion of whom, we 
understand, do not speak English as their first language) will not be 
 
 289. See Cherry, The Sharing Economy, supra note 97.  
 290. See discussion supra Part II. 
 291. For recent accounts of the use of EULAs and pre-dispute mandatory arbitration as 
a way of managing workplace liability for employers in the United States, see Jean R. 
Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory 
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) 
(“Today employers, with substantial assistance from the Supreme Court, are using mandatory 
arbitration clauses to ‘disarm’ employees, effectively preventing them from bringing most 
individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to justice. It has been estimated that 
roughly 20% of the non-unionized American workforce is covered by mandatory arbitration 
provisions, and this number may well increase.”). For more on arbitration as a method of 
containing costs toward consumers, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 871 (2008) (“We provide the first study of varying 
use of arbitration clauses across contracts within the same firms. Using a sample of 26 
consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts from large public corporations, we 
compared the use of arbitration clauses in firms’ consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Over 
three-quarters of the consumer agreements provided for mandatory arbitration but less than 
10% of the firms' material nonconsumer, nonemployment contracts included arbitration 
clauses. The absence of arbitration provisions in the vast majority of material contracts suggests 
that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefer, litigation over arbitration to resolve disputes with 
peers. Our data suggest that the frequent use of arbitration clauses in the same firms’ consumer 
contracts may be an effort to preclude aggregate consumer action rather than, as often claimed, 
an effort to promote fair and efficient dispute resolution.”). But see Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 433-34 (2010) (discussing issues in previous studies on the use of 
arbitration clauses).  
 292. Aslam & Ors. v. Uber B.V. & Ors., [2016] EW Misc B68, [89] (ET) (28 Oct. 
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accustomed to reading and interpreting dense legal documents couched 
in impenetrable prose. This is . . . an excellent illustration . . . of “armies 
of lawyers” contriving documents in their clients’ interests which simply 
misrepresent the true rights and obligations on both sides.293 
Instead, the tribunal relied on a discussion of thirteen points of analysis 
to show that Uber was not working for the drivers; that instead, the 
drivers were working for Uber.294 These points included key issues of 
recruitment; control over information regarding the passengers; Uber’s 
setting of default routes, pricing structures, conditions on drivers, 
instructions for drivers, and the establishment of disciplinary and rating 
systems; and that Uber handles complaints from passengers.295  
 Choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses are certainly useful 
for reducing wasteful litigation about where a dispute should be heard 
and what rules should apply.296 It is also understandable that platforms 
would desire to manage risk. The concern is that if multinational 
platform operators can choose the law that they impose through an 
adhesive contract, they might decide to pick jurisdictions in which there 
either is no law; ones in which there seems to be a favorable precedent 
or the likelihood of one; or jurisdictions where labor standards are quite 
low.297 In other words, the race to the bottom in labor standards.  
 The material that I have set out above on choice of law in labor 
and employment law cases shows that this approach will not work, at 
least not in California, India, and the European Union. And it might not 
work in other jurisdictions, if it is determined that platforms are skirting 
at the edge of regulation or engaged in strategic forum shopping. In 
some countries, that might take the form of national governments 
telling platforms that they must classify platform workers as employees 
or else they need to do business elsewhere.298  
 
 293. Id. at [96]. 
 294. Id. at [92]. The analysis proceeded under the 1996 Act, Section 230(b), referred to 
in the decision as a “limb b” type case. 
 295. Id. at [92]. 
 296. See Posner, supra note 242, at 261-62. 
 297. Cf. Peter Link, One Small Step for the United States, May Be One Giant Leap for 
Seafarers’ Rights, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167, 178-79 (2015) (explaining the race to 
the bottom in maritime cases).  
 298. See, e.g., Eliana Dockterman, Uber and Lyft Are Leaving Austin After Losing 
Background Check Vote, TIME (May 8, 2016), http://time.com/4322348/uber-lyft-austin-
background-check-vote/; cf. Johana Bhuiyan, Uber and Didi Are Now Legal in China but the 
Struggle to Sign Up Drivers May Continue, VOX (July 28, 2016, 1:42 PM), https://www. 
recode.net/2016/7/28/12311362/uber-didi-china-legal (explaining Chinese regulatory guidelines 
for Uber drivers such as minimum experience and maximum mileage); Josh Horwitz, One 
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 Private ordering cannot and will not provide a complete solution 
to these problems. Because of the power imbalances embodied in many 
of the online terms of service used by platforms, they are not the 
product of equal bargaining power.299 Traditional choice-of-law 
doctrines have recognized this with the Rome Regulation presenting 
workers with probably the most favorable structure for enforcing their 
rights of the three examined.300 All of the systems recognize that any 
choice-of-law rules must work in tandem with the background private 
international rules.301  
E. Conflicts of Law in the Gig Economy (Without Choice-of-Law 
Clauses) 
 As of the date of this Article’s publication, no case law, statutes, 
directives, or other precedent are on point for dealing with the issues of 
jurisdiction, conflict of law, or choice of law and crowdwork platforms 
in California, the European Union, or India. Yet with that said, we can 
use some of the existing private international law concepts and 
precedents discussed above to make some general predictions about 
how a court in each of these jurisdictions might consider the issues if 
seized with a question that involves multiple jurisdictions and gig 
work, without the application of a choice-of-law clause. As there 
currently is no live case or controversy where arguments are being 
asserted, the discussion herein is of necessity rather abstract. 
 Beginning with California, a company’s decision to set up its 
headquarters or even to host its server in the state of California would 
establish the necessary minimum contacts for jurisdiction. Beyond 
initial jurisdiction, with California’s territorial turn along with the 
governmental interest approach, the location of the other parties 
involved would be important.302 Because the questions around 
employment of platform workers generally involve a claim that the 
platform is the employer and not generally the requester, the requester 
seems to fall out of the equation.303 Even though the relationship is 
 
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/1045268/one-year-after-the-uber-didi-merger-its-only-getting-
harder-to-hail-a-ride-in-china/ (discussing the decline in availability of Uber due to decreased 
wages and local laws). 
 299. See Aslam, EW Misc B68 at [102]. 
 300. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 301. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
 302. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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triangular, it is difficult to go back as against the requester.304 There 
might be an exception through the application of the joint employer 
doctrine, in the case of a company that was perhaps posting an 
enormous number of tasks to a crowdsourcing platform, creating the 
equivalent of a virtual workforce on these platforms. The jurisdictional 
issues with minimum contacts would also be true in both the European 
Union and India. 
 In all three jurisdictions, focus would largely remain on the place 
where the work was habitually carried out, which is similar to the 
received wisdom about where the worker is physically located.305 This 
approach will cause major problems for platforms with the need to 
comply with many sets of jurisdictional rules and regulations, once 
statutes and judicial rulings begin to regulate.306 So, if there is truly a 
globalized platform, and it is ethical and wants to comply with the law, 
and it has workers from fifty different countries, the platform will need 
compliance with all fifty of the regulatory regimes and will also be 
subject to suit under all of them. Right now, the process “works” 
because there is no regulation, and thus the platforms do what they 
want. However, that will not be case five or ten years from now, when 
there is regulation.   
 Thinking about India, specifically, consider Indian private 
international law rules.307 Assume that a group of Indian crowdworkers 
wanted to bring a claim for wage theft or failure to pay minimum wage 
against a platform based in the United States or the European Union. 
Note that such situations are commonplace on crowdwork platforms, 
where requesters have a great deal of power to reject work, in some 
instances not paying the workers who completed the tasks but retaining 
the benefit of the work.308 If crowdworkers in India were to bring a 
lawsuit in an Indian court, for example,309 the court would have 
 
 304. Id. 
 305. MORGENSTERN, supra note 44, at 121. 
 306. See Cherry, Global Dimensions, supra note 33, at 487.  
 307. All of these instances are hypothetical but entirely possible. 
 308. See Cherry & Poster, supra note 36, at 387; Berg, Income Security, supra note 14, 
at 15. In the ILO Survey, some workers noted that the requester could reject their work on a 
summary basis, without providing reasons. All of these led to dissatisfaction among those 
surveyed.  
 309. Cf. Tom Batchelor, India to Introduce Minimum Wage for Millions of Workers, 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india- 
minimum-wage-domestic-workers-labour-ministry-a8005711.html (reporting that domestic 
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jurisdiction to hear the case, regardless of the location of the platform, 
thanks to the jurisdictional element.  
 Although Part IV has employed a methodical approach, setting 
out the private international law in three jurisdictions, and then 
applying the doctrines, though without current concrete cases, the 
issues are still nascent. Further, even applying the best knowledge we 
have through the toolkit of private international law, many of these 
questions do not have cut-and-dried answers. Returning to the 
examples provided in the beginning of this Article—what rights would 
Syrian national refugees have when temporarily located in a camp in 
Jordan, and the platform they use is hosted in the United Kingdom, and 
the customers for the website who are trying to learn a language are 
located in eighty different countries around the world? If private 
ordering will only result in a race to the bottom, and the toolkit of 
private international law is unwieldy in its application and yields 
uncertain results, we need to look elsewhere for appropriate solutions. 
Part V discusses regulatory options and helpful constructs for dealing 
with these emergent problems. 
V. REGULATORY OPTIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it.” 
—Alan Kay310 
 As crowdwork is a genuinely global enterprise, it runs counter to 
the received wisdom that labor and employment law is a matter only 
for national authorities and local regulation.311 At the moment, the stage 
is set for disagreement and conflicting regulations between nations 
about how to characterize or even approach the labor problems 
associated with gig work.312 Moreover, as with any type of labor 
regulation, there is a worry about capital flight and races to the bottom 
in labor standards.313 In some ways, these problems are just a 
heightened form of some of the enduring and difficult conundrums of 
global labor law and the global supply chain.314  
 
 310. Elaine Williams, Kay’s Hand Rocks the Cradle of Creativity, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
1982, at 13, LexisNexis. 
 311. See discussion supra Part II. 
 312. See De Stefano, Platform Work, supra note 17. 
 313. Indeed, as platforms have few physical assets tying them to any geographic 
location, the race to the bottom may present an even more important concern. 
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 This Part sets out several strategies for thinking about 
transnational regulation of crowdwork and the harmonization that is 
necessary for a successful system of international regulation. The first 
possibility is to look at regulations, like the European Union’s GDPR, 
that of necessity have an extraterritorial reach. Second, one idea that 
may prove fruitful would be to examine other employment sectors 
where the physical location of workers has been subtracted from the 
law’s calculus. The third option might seek to link crowdwork to the 
discussion over ethical sourcing throughout the global supply chain. 
Corporate social responsibility and corporate codes of conduct can set 
best practices and standards for computer crowdwork; these forms of 
“soft law” cross borders and are influential. Part V ends by thinking 
backwards about preferences for decent crowdwork and then calling 
upon national governments, unions, employers, and policymakers to 
plan for what compliance looks like. As an international standard-
setting body of importance, it is crucial that the ILO continue to study 
the problem closely, whether through the mechanism of a committee 
of experts or through solicitations for guidelines that might help in the 
process of harmonization.  
A. Extraterritorial Reach of Statutes: The Example of the General 
Data Protection Regulation 
 The European Union’s 2018 enactment of the GDPR is of interest 
worldwide, applying to any company that collects data from or 
employs citizens of the European Union.315 Its expansive jurisdictional 
reach and liberal interpretation of “personal data” has created interest 
and concern among multinational firms, engendering discussion and 
the need for legal insight.316 At a glance, the GDPR pertains to the 
processing of personal data “wholly or partly by automated means” or 
 
 315. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1(2), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (“This Regulation 
protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the 
protection of personal data.”). For more on the theoretical background of data protection as a 
fundamental right in the European Union, see generally MARIA TZANOU, THE FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION: NORMATIVE VALUE IN THE CONTEXT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
SURVEILLANCE (2017) (discussing the scope of the right, current state of legal scholarship and 
case studies in communications meta data, travel data, financial data, and Internet data 
surveillance).  
 316. See Bryan Dunne, The GDPR Countdown: Employers Are You Ready?—Consent, 
MATHESON (May 4, 2018), https://www.matheson.com/news-and-insights/article/the-gdpr-
countdown-employers-are-you-ready-employee-consent. In addition, consent must be able to 
be as easily withdrawn as given, which would open scenarios of consent being withdrawn and 
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where personal data forms part of a filing system.317 A list of the basic 
principles of data are set forth in article 5,318 and article 6 sets forth legal 
limits for processing the data.319 
 Perhaps most interestingly for purposes of this Article, in article 3 
the GDPR sets out the jurisdiction of the GDPR, which “applies to the 
processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union,” even if the 
processing does not take place within a Member State.320 A controller 
not established in the Union has it apply to them “by virtue of public 
international law.”321 Article 83, among other recitals, states that the 
penalties for noncompliance with certain provisions of the GDPR can 
range from ten million322 to twenty million Euro yearly.323 
 The threshold for determining whether someone is offering goods 
or services for sale in the European Union is a key point for determining 
applicability of the GDPR.324 Recitals in the GDPR mention that 
among other things, offering multiple languages, offering payment in 
Euro, using domain names of Member States, or offering local 
testimonials will trigger GDPR compliance issues.325 Privacy 
specialists have also noted that tracking and monitoring of data has a 
“wide net,” and they generally urge companies to engage in compliance 
measures to see if they fall under the regulations.326 Thus, locating 
computer servers in the United States327 does not exempt a company 
 
 317. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 2(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (EU). 
 318. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(f), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35-36. Among these principles are 
transparency with the data subject, limitation on collecting purpose, limitation of collecting, 
and accuracy.  
 319. Id. art. 6(1)(a)-(f), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37.  
 320. Id. art. 3(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32. 
 321. Id. art. 3(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33.  
 322. Id. art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 82. 
 323. Id. art. 83(5), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 83.  
 324. Kevin Kish, What Does Territorial Scope Mean Under the GDPR?, INT’L ASS’N 
PRIVACY PROFS. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-does-territorial-scope-mean-
under-the-gdpr/#; see also MEG LETA JONES, CTRL+Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 168-71 
(2016) (discussing extraterritorial reach of GDPR and noting controversies). 
 325. Kish, supra note 324. 
 326. Id. A few examples of monitoring as analyzed by IAPP include online advertising 
based on behavior, fitness tracking, location tracking via apps, and tracking of public 
transportation. 
 327. Aaron Winston, How the EU Can Fine US Companies for Violating GDPR, 
SPICEWORKS (June 21, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://community.spiceworks.com/topic/2007530-
how-the-eu-can-fine-us-companies-for-violating-gdpr. U.S. companies with a physical 
presence within the European Union will have the Regulation “enforced directly” upon them 
just as it would be for a totally EU-based company. Cf. JONES, supra note 324, at 168 (noting 
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from following the strictures of the GDPR.328 Traditionally the United 
States and European Union have been cooperative regarding reciprocal 
enforcement of respective laws.329  
 While the GDPR’s applicability to crowdwork, big data,330 and 
people analytics331 shall have to be addressed in other articles, the main 
reason for discussing it here is to examine how the regulations of the 
European Union on privacy could have an impact on privacy practices 
around the world. A similar approach, involving a statute regulating 
crowdwork with a far-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction is one 
possibility for overcoming the private international law challenges that 
crowdwork poses. Although we typically think of employment and 
labor regulation as part of national law, the example of the GDPR 
should make regulators take notice. Rather than decline to regulate at 
all because of problems with jurisdiction, it might make more sense to 
learn from the far-reaching implementation of the GDPR.  
B. The Possibility of Sectoral Regulation 
 Another option for thinking about crowdwork is to compare it to 
other forms of work that are divorced from physical location. 
Traditionally there are some occupations, such as traveling sales, 
transportation workers, or seafarers, which have fallen outside and 
apart from the territorial jurisdiction of national regulation.332 In 
thinking about solutions to the regulatory and jurisdictional problems 
posed by crowdwork, one possible answer is a specific sectoral 
approach. Here is a description of some of the issues that maritime 
employment law practitioners used to confront: 
It is not unusual for a seafarer to work on a vessel registered in a foreign 
country, sailing on the high seas and calling at ports in countries other 
than that of her flag, owned by citizens of yet other countries, insured in 
other countries, perhaps chartered by interests in other countries, 
managed by a company in another country, and carrying cargo owned by 
citizens of other countries. More than a half-dozen different countries 
 
 328. Cf. Kurt Wimmer, Free Expression and EU Privacy Regulation: Can the GDPR 
Reach U.S. Publishers?, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 547, 548-49 (2018) (explaining how companies 
based outside of the European Union are subject to the GDPR and lawsuits arising from it). 
 329. See id. 
 330. See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 
SETON HALL L. REV. 995 (2017) (discussing the problems of the GDPR’s implementation on 
Big Data). 
 331. See Bodie et al., supra note 90, at 987. 
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may be directly connected to a vessel's operations. When problems arise, 
which country has jurisdiction? Which country's or countries' laws 
apply—and what laws within that country affect seafarers?333 
These issues sound remarkably similar to the transnational issues 
pertaining to gig work and computer crowdwork. While crowdworkers 
are not physically traveling in the same way that ships’ crews are, the 
work that they produce certainly is in motion, given that it often arrives 
from a foreign nation and is sent back to another, while other parts of 
the work are being amalgamated from workers in other nations.       
 Effective international regulation of maritime workers took over 
a century of effort to achieve. In the nineteenth century, a seafarer’s life 
was a difficult one, with few, if any safeguards against wage theft, 
safety hazards, or poor working conditions.334 At that time, the 
dominant international law regulating the seas was the centuries-old 
concept of freedom of the seas.335 Apart from this paradigm of mare 
liberum, antagonistic powers created rigid codes that constituted a 
“harmful corollary” of regulation.336 As the amount of goods shipped 
at sea increased, so too did concern over potentially exploitative or poor 
working conditions for seafarers.337 Positions on ships were often 
temporary. Workers faced isolation, enduring separations from friends 
and families for months at a time.338 In extreme situations, workers 
could find themselves abandoned at foreign ports with no money and 
no passage to return home.339  
 Beginning in 1897, the International Maritime Committee (IMC) 
began advocating for greater unification of maritime law and adopted 
 
 333. Douglas B. Stevenson, Book Review, 36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 567, 567 (2005) 
(reviewing SEAFARER’S RIGHTS (Deirdre Fitzpatrick & Michael Anderson eds., 2005)). 
 334. GERARD J. MANGONE, UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY LAW 117 (1997) (“From 
antiquity to modern times the life of the ordinary seaman has been woeful: exposed to the 
frightful perils of the world ocean for months or years; . . . deprived of family or normal human 
society for long periods; and, until recently, subjected to the arbitrary command of a master at 
sea.”); see also Life Aboard, NEW BEDFORD WHALING MUSEUM, https://www.whaling 
museum.org/learn/research-topics/overview-of-north-american-whaling/life-aboard (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2019) (describing conditions aboard whaling ships). 
 335. See ALBERT LILAR & CARLO VAN DEN BOSCH, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
COMMITTEE: 1897-1972, at 4-6 (1972). 
 336. Id.  
 337. MANGONE, supra note 334 (noting that the flogging of seamen was not outlawed 
in the United States until 1850 and that brutal discipline continued throughout the century, and 
that the system of “crimping,” i.e., pressing alcoholics or penniless people onto ships continued 
until the late 1800s). 
 338. Link, supra note 297, at 174. 
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regulations and protocols to further harmonization.340 In the ensuing 
years, the IMC began to fashion the standards and organization 
necessary to provide cooperation between seafaring states.341 In 1948, 
the United Nations established a department, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), which had as its goal regulating the 
resources of the ocean and the people who work on it.342 The many 
international treaties overseen by the IMO include the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)343 and the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), both promulgated 
and adopted in the 1970s and 1980s.344 These sets of regulations 
established that ship owners would register their ships with a nation 
and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the country whose flag 
they flew. The duties of a flag state included maintaining a register, 
assuming jurisdiction of laws, legal liability, and proper regulations 
including compliance with labor conditions.345 However, problems 
remained because ships could register with so-called flags of 
convenience, states with low standards or lax enforcement that in fact 
encouraged a race to the bottom.346   
 In 2006, under the auspices of the UN-ILO, the International 
Labor Conference took up the project of consolidating and 
modernizing the sixty-plus instruments that concerned various aspects 
of maritime employment in the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC).347 
 
 340. F.L. Wiswall, A Brief History, COMITE MAR. INT’L (June 2018), https://comite 
maritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/a-brief-history-wiswall.pdf. 
 341. Nigel H. Frawley, A Brief History: The CMI and Its Relationship with IMO, the 
IOPC Funds and Other UN Organisations, COMITE MAR. INT’L (Jan. 7, 2011), https:// 
comitemaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/A-brief-History-Frawlye.pdf. Over time, IMO 
would adopt most of CMI’s protocols. 
 342. Brief History of IMO, IMO, www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryofIMO/pages/Default. 
aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 343. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) pmbl., Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 344. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. II-1, Nov. 11, 1974, 1184 
U.N.T.S. 289. See generally Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 41 INT’L L. 671, 
671 (2007) (discussing UNCLOS, international security, agreements, disputes, and the law of 
the sea in U.S. federal courts).  
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Insecurity on the High Seas, 5 U. PA. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2006-2007); see also Link, supra 
note 297, at 178-79 (noting race to the bottom). 
 347. Maritime Labour Convention pmbl., Feb. 23, 2006, 2952 U.N.T.S. 7; see also 
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Every seafarer under the MLC has a right to working conditions that 
comply with international standards, fair terms of employment, 
medical care, and decent living conditions, and these rights are set out 
in five titles.348 Title I sets forth minimum and basic requirements, such 
as age requirements, adequate training, and employment notification 
standards.349 Title II covers the conditions of employment, including 
notice of termination periods, regular wage payment and calculation, 
hours, leave, repatriation, and compensation.350 Title III concerns 
decency of accommodation and recreation, including quality of food 
served aboard.351 Title IV ensures adequate healthcare provisions, 
places liability for workers’ health on the owner of the ship, requires 
safety standards to be followed, and provides for social insurance for 
seafarers.352  
 Finally, Title V discusses the enforcement of the other titles. Each 
signatory must agree to implementation through authorization of 
compliance inspections and maintaining Maritime Labor Certificates 
certifying compliance once those inspections are complete.353 Title V 
also concerns inspections in port states, complaint procedures on shore, 
and maintenance of the labor supply.354 The goal of the MLC is to 
ensure parity of maritime laborers with those performing the same 
types of tasks on land. 
 Since its promulgation in 2006 and its effectuation in 2013, the 
MLC can by all accounts be considered a success. As of the date of this 
writing, eighty-two states have ratified the convention.355 While that 
may only sound like half of the states needed, the MLC actually covers 
over ninety percent of the tonnage shipped.356 Because ships can be 
stopped and checked for violations by the flag state, the port of 
departure, and the port of entry, regulators in many different countries 
 
 348. Maritime Labour Convention, supra note 347, at 10, art. IV. 
 349. Id. tit. I, regulations 1.1-1.4, at 19-27. 
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have uniform measures to ensure that wages have been paid and that 
working conditions onboard are safe for seafarers.357  
 Some issues present in maritime employment stand out as directly 
applicable to the situation and status of online crowdworkers.358 Both 
the jobs on many online work sites and the crewing of a ship are meant 
as temporary or transitory, lasting only as long as the job. There is 
potential for social isolation in both types of work. On a ship, this is 
because of physical distance from family and friends. With computer 
crowdwork, because the work is performed in isolation, rather than in 
a workplace. The specter of wage theft is a shared threat as well. 
However, the most striking parallel is, of course, the international 
aspect of both types of work with work being transitory and mobile. In 
the case of the maritime worker, that is because the job of necessity 
involves transport and travel over long distances. In the case of online 
crowdworkers, work is being generated, sent, processed, and stored in 
many different locations and fellow workers are located around the 
world.  
 As such, crowdwork might benefit from the type of sectoral 
regulation that exists in maritime employment. That would mean 
regulations specifically crafted and tailored to fit the requirements, 
special issues, and needs of online crowdworkers. Like the ports that 
can check for compliance with the MLC, various host or entry points 
could be checked for compliance in the network that comprises 
crowdwork. Because the workers behind the platform are largely 
invisible, such regulatory checks would necessarily involve the 
turnover of data. 
 The idea of sectoral regulation is likely controversial. I have no 
doubt there are some academics writing about labor relations who 
would object to the idea that crowdwork is in any way different than 
offline work or deserving of special status or treatment. This group 
might complain that crowdwork is not a sui generis type of 
employment that deserves its own set of rules. The reasoning would be 
that if crowdworkers are treated as a special category, they would 
somehow not be seen as deserving of the same kinds of labor rights that 
other workers have. One response would be to refer to the other types 
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of workers that receive sectoral regulation and to point to the benefits 
that have accrued to them.  
C. Corporate Social Responsibility, Global Supply Chains, and 
Best Practices for Crowdwork  
 The issue of fair standards for online work has connections to 
existing issues that have already been discussed in the context of global 
supply chains for products. Global supply chains may obscure poor 
labor practices by dispersing businesses geographically and breaking 
down the operations, functions, and participants in work into many 
segments, some of which involve invisible labor.359 Through global 
labor arbitrage, multinational companies may move jobs to countries 
where hiring workers is less expensive, where they can save money on 
rent and physical infrastructure, and where they may receive 
exemptions from legal regulations in return for foreign investment.360 
The phenomenon is now standard for business practice: approximately 
eighty percent of Fortune 500 companies in the United States outsource 
some of their functions abroad, and a large percentage of that 
outsourcing is to the global south.361 Unfortunately, there is little 
transparency in these global supply chains for products, and because 
foreign workers are largely invisible to the parent company and 
consumers, poor working conditions can prevail. For example, in 2014, 
a fire and building collapse in Bangladesh killed over 1100 workers 
who were sewing clothes for American labels including Walmart, 
Target, and The Gap.362 Due to the growth of crowdwork and many of 
the trends that accompany the trend toward increasingly temporary and 
precarious work arrangements, it is important to think about how these 
new forms of work fit into the existing legal regulation of work, 
including the need to trace labor in global supply chains. If regulation 
along a global supply chain is a problem, then corporate social 
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VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 953, 987-88 (2010) (exhaustive treatment of issues with global supply 
chains in Canada). 
 361. DELOITTE, GLOBAL OUTSOURCING AND INSOURCING SURVEY 7 (2014). 
 362. Steven Greenhouse & Elizabeth A. Harris, Battling for a Safer Bangladesh, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/international/battling-





56 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:x 
 
responsibility and corporate codes of conduct may help to provide an 
answer.  
 Corporate social responsibility takes a wider view of a 
corporation’s purpose than a single-minded focus on shareholder 
primacy and profit.363 Generally, corporate social responsibility means 
managing a business with equal regard for the triple bottom line,364 that 
is financial performance, environmental consequences and labor 
standards, and social impact.365 In addition to “the traditional bottom 
line of financial performance (most often expressed in terms of profits, 
return on investment (ROI), or shareholder value)” a firm should also 
mind its “impact on the broader economy, the environment, and on the 
society in which [it] operate[s].”366 In fact, this triple focus often 
improves firms’ financial bottom lines as much as it helps the 
environment and society. To take one example, efforts to reduce waste 
and pollution often result in greater efficiency and the discovery of 
innovative techniques and materials.367 
 Compliance with labor standards is often discussed as a form of 
corporate social responsibility. But following the law, surely, is a basic 
obligation of corporations, as well as citizens. How then is basic 
compliance considered socially responsible? It helps to think of 
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corporate social responsibility as a type of continuum, with firms 
integrating these concepts in their operations to varying degrees. At one 
end of the spectrum, a firm may have no ambition to be socially 
responsible and in fact be out of compliance with applicable labor and 
environmental laws and regulations.368 At this stage, the focus is on 
profits to the exclusion of all other considerations and the firm may 
even deliberately violate laws in order to maximize corporate profits.  
 Slightly more socially responsible is the firm that complies with 
applicable laws and perhaps engages in generic corporate philanthropy 
but does little beyond that.369 These firms see “no business case” for 
going beyond compliance or serving stakeholders’ interests.370 To these 
firms, “the business of business is business” and by bare compliance 
(and paying taxes) they see themselves as fulfilling their societal 
obligations.371 A third type of firm moves beyond bare compliance but 
only does so where it would be profitable.372 These firms may view 
corporate social responsibility primarily as a public relations matter, for 
particularly in consumer-focused industries, social responsibility 
attracts customers and social irresponsibility repels.373 These 
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companies may also pursue a socially responsible agenda to save 
resources, reduce waste, achieve production efficiencies, and anticipate 
changing conditions, regulations, and consumer preferences.374 These 
firms may incorporate environmental, ethical, and social 
considerations at all levels of their operations and decision making, but 
only act upon them when it would benefit their financial bottom 
lines.375   
 A fourth type of firm routinely balances economic, social, and 
environmental considerations and does so not in order to comply with 
applicable laws or to make a profit.376 Rather, these firms are motivated 
by altruism to “do good”—for their various constituencies and for the 
planet—while still producing handsome returns for their 
shareholders.377 These firms also tend to be more proactive, partnering 
with government, “suppliers, customers, [and] others in the[ir] 
industry” to together innovate sustainable solutions to environmental 
and other problems.378 At the next level of corporate social 
responsibility, firms integrate social responsibility principles into their 
strategy and business processes (starting with product or service 
development) such that the way of doing business is “built in, not 
bolted on.”379 For example, companies at this stage may rethink their 
design and production processes to reduce waste, utilize improved, 
sustainable, and even reusable materials, and in some cases eliminate 
the use of harmful materials altogether. These firms aim to serve all 
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 374. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 291 (2007) (noting that “sophisticated corporate 
managers” are “tak[ing] into account the possibility of increased governmental regulation; the 
increasing risk of a costly response to changing environmental conditions . . . .; and growing 
consumer preference for products sold by companies that are good corporate citizens”). 
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their stakeholders, creating value for shareholders, by matching 
“corporate objectives [with] wider societal challenges.”380 At the sixth 
and highest level, corporate social responsibility “is fully integrated and 
embedded in every aspect of the organization,” which is committed to 
“contributing to the quality and continuation of life of every being and 
entity, now and in[to] the future.”381 Here, companies also redesign or 
“reengineer” their business models, financial institutions, and markets 
to identify and root out any underlying causes inconsistent with social 
responsibility. Aside from a few outliers,382 however, corporate social 
responsibility rarely moves beyond the third, profit-driven level 
described above. This encompasses a great deal of socially responsible 
behavior and business practices, to be sure.  
 Specifically for global labor standards, many approaches have 
tended to focus on the level of the articulation of corporate codes of 
conduct and compliance with those codes.383 Several studies report that 
socially responsible business practices tend to be profitable,384 and the 
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popular business press is replete with anecdotal evidence in further 
support of this hypothesis.385 While corporate codes of conduct are 
typically voluntary,386 and thus an exercise in “soft law,” they can be 
extremely important sources of self-regulation and also a way for 
industries to develop “best practices.”387 Those best practices of an 
industry often form the basis for the starting point of regulation. After 
all, industry leaders who have participated in and helped to craft the 
codes of conduct and who are already meeting those standards are most 
likely to endorse compliance. In fact, such codes provide a type of “buy 
in” for those industry leaders who would rather compete on a level 
playing field, free from competitors who ignore or flout minimum labor 
standards.  
 In the crowdwork sector, such efforts have already begun. As 
noted in my coauthored book, Invisible Labor, “Technology may hide 
workers from a Web site’s ultimate users or consumers, who . . . may 
not even know that a human is working at all.”388 Labor activists have 
attempted to change this dynamic over the years, through protests 
specifically designed to make workers more visible. In 2015, Stanford 
researchers and crowdworkers organized the Dynamo campaign, 
which was described as “a community platform designed to gather 
ideas, energy, and support directed towards collective action.”389 A 
primary focus of Dynamo was overcoming the twin issues that seemed 
to be opposing collective action in the sector, which they described as 
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“stalling” and “friction.”390 Two of Dynamo’s initiatives secured 
significant media attention: the articulation of guidelines for academic 
researchers and a letter-writing campaign targeted at Amazon CEO Jeff 
Bezos.391  
 The guidelines were aimed at academic researchers, who 
commonly post surveys, psychological tests, and other similar tasks 
online. Many of the tasks came under fire because of the low rates of 
pay offered. Amazon now officially suggests that requesters use 
Dynamo’s Guidelines for Academic Requesters as a basis “[t]o help 
new Requesters get started successfully with MTurk.”392 The 
guidelines include standards of identification, timeliness, and fair 
pay.393 As such, this part of the Dynamo effort seems to have had a 
lasting impact.  
 Codes of conduct prompt a discussion of what “socially 
responsible” or “sustainable” online or app platforms might look like. 
In fact, some of the platforms might actually be run and owned by 
crowdworkers. Professors Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider have 
written extensively about platform cooperatives.394 Rather than work 
for a wage, workers who are also cooperative owners are able to keep 
most of the money earned from their platform. Only a percentage of 
their earnings go back to the platform in order to invest in upkeep and 
functionality, rather than pay dividends out to shareholders.  
 Even in businesses not owned by workers, we could imagine 
socially responsible on-demand platforms. First, we should assume that 
such a business wanting to establish such norms would likely adhere to 
a corporate code of conduct and corporate social responsibility 
norms.395 These would encompass the idea of fair remuneration and 
compliance with minimum wage laws. Disclosure and transparency are 
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also important, so that workers understand the projects they are 
working on (and supporting through their labor).396 Finally, there would 
be procedural safeguards for workers on platforms. If there are rating 
systems that are being built up over time, then workers should be able 
to have access to that data.397 It is also important to ensure for 
procedural protections so that wage theft does not occur if the work is 
performed, but the task is “rejected.” As these soft law standards 
develop, we can hope for a code of conduct for crowdwork that applies 
regardless of jurisdiction, and that balances the needs of gig workers 
along with those of the platforms.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Online crowdwork presents endlessly fascinating conflicts-of-
law, jurisdiction, and choice-of-law problems that will only become 
more salient as platforms become more established, more legal systems 
begin to enforce existing regulations or pass new ones, and the legal 
issues around the gig economy reach an increasing number of 
legislatures and courts. This Article has sought, on a practical level, to 
work through the labyrinth of doctrinal issues, using the available 
toolkit of private international law and its intersection with nationally 
based labor and employment laws. The analysis, however, only serves 
to point out the shortcomings of the existing laws and approaches. 
 Working through the maze of corporate compliance concerns and 
labor standards issues that global crowdwork has created exposes far 
deeper fault lines in the territorial-based approach to labor and 
employment law. As long as the focus for regulation remains on 
“workplaces” and physical locations where work is performed, 
effective regulation of crowdwork will remain elusive. Returning to the 
Introduction, there will be no easy answers for what law to apply to 
TaskRabbit, Upwork, or Chatterbox. Rather than focus on geographical 
approaches, this Article has tried to marshal a number of suggestions, 
looking at extraterritorial applications of law, sectoral regulation, and 
the soft law of corporate codes of conduct, to provide the possibility for 
ways forward. Socially responsible crowdwork is possible, but it will 
require creative thinking and the cooperation of platforms, workers, 
and regulatory organizations. 
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